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INTRODUCTION
Are the U.S. capital markets losing their competitiveness?' A fas-
cinating question, but what does it mean and how can it be intelli-
gently assessed? This Article will explore the newly popular thesis that
draconian enforcement and overregulation are injuring the United
States and will offer a sharply contrasting interpretation: higher en-
forcement intensity gives the U.S. economy a lower cost of capital and
higher securities valuations. This higher intensity attracts some for-
eign listings, but deters others.
This Article will proceed by first mapping the marked variation in
the intensity of enforcement efforts by securities regulators in selected
nations and then relating these variations to (1) the cost of equity
capital, (2) the extraordinary listing premium that non-U.S. firms ex-
I For the suggestion that there has been a decline in their competitiveness, see
COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 2-6 (2006), http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/
11.30CommitteeInterim-ReportREV2.pdf [hereinafter PAULSON REPORT]. The au-
thor is listed as a "Task Force Member" on this report. Id. at ii. The Paulson Report
was swiftly followed by a study by New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Sena-
tor Charles Schumer that reached similar conclusions. See MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG &
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE U.S.' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SER-
VICES LEADERSHIP 10-14 (2007) (arguing that global macroeconomic trends are
threatening the United States' historical preeminence in capital markets). The author
also served as a consultant to this report. As will be evident, this author is not in full
agreement with either report, but does believe that the issue of capital market com-
petitiveness is serious and justifies continuing attention.
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hibit upon cross-listing on a U.S. exchange,2 and (3) the alleged flight
of some foreign issuers from the U.S. markets. 3 Once properly disag-
gregated, the impact of high-intensity enforcement appears to yield
both costs and benefits. In overview, high-intensity enforcement may
dissuade some issuers from entering the U.S. market and, thus, could
be responsible for some of the asserted decline in the "competitive-
ness" of the U.S. capital markets. But, at the same time, other firms
2 Data about the magnitude of this cross-listing premium are presented infra at
notes 11, 16, and 157-184, and in the accompanying text. The source of this premium
is less certain, but at least three complementary explanations are all plausible:
(1) The act of cross-listing may be a signal that the corporation's future cash
flows will be greater than the market previously perceived (possibly because
the managers are so convinced of their superior investment prospects that
they will take the costly and risky step of listing in the United States markets);
(2) The act of cross-listing may also be a form of bonding that assures investors
that agency costs will be reduced (or at least will be lower than they previ-
ously perceived), because the firm's managers have subjected themselves to
SEC scrutiny and private and public enforcement systems that are unique to
the United States; and
(3) The act of cross-listing may decrease the discount rate on the market's ex-
pectation of future cash flows; this reduction in the discount rate (and
hence increase in share price for any given expected level of future cash
flows) is the product of reduced informational asymmetry (in part because
of the increased enforcement risk), which in turn leads to a narrower
bid/asked spread.
This Article will argue that increased enforcement risk associated with entry into the
U.S. market affects all three of these explanations.
3 Although a number of commentators have opined that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. (2000 & Supp. III 2004)), and high enforcement intensity, including pri-
vate enforcement through securities class actions, have damaged the competitiveness
of the U.S. economy, the latest empirical survey finds that the market share of foreign
listings held by U.S. exchanges (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NASDAQ,
and American Stock and Options Exchange (AMEX)) has "increased from 1998 to
2005 relative to the market share of the [London Stock Exchange]'s Main Market."
Craig Doidge et al., Has New York Become Less Competitive in Global Markets? Evaluating
Foreign Listing Choices Over Time 4 (Charles A. Dice Ctr. for Research in Fin. Econ.,
Working Paper No. 2007-9, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982193. Al-
though the evidence is clear that the London Stock Exchange has lost ground in its
ability to attract foreign issuers, its subsidiary, the Alternative Investment Market
(AIM), which is a market that specially caters to small and start-up firms that are not
eligible to list on the major U.S. exchanges, has had considerable success in attracting
IPO listings. Id. If, however, one focuses on firms with characteristics that qualify
them to list on a U.S. exchange, there is little evidence that such firms are less likely to
so cross-list today. Id. at 4-5; see also Stavros Peristiani, Evaluating the Relative Strength of
the U.S. Capital Markets, CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN. (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., New
York, N.Y.), July 2007, at 1, 3, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/
currentissues/cil3-6.pdf (finding evidence of the decline of U.S. equity markets to be
mixed and generally agreeing with Doidge et al.).
2007]
232 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYL VANIA LA W REVIEW
are attracted to U.S. markets. In effect, there is a separating equilib-
4
rium as foreign issuers go both ways. The critical issue for the con-
trolling shareholder of the foreign issuer (who is the real decision
maker in most cross-listing decisions) is whether the private benefits
of control that it will sacrifice by entering the U.S. market exceed (or
fall below) the value to it of the higher securities valuation and re-
duced cost of capital that it will gain from cross-listing in the United
States.
More generally, enforcement may also be the hidden variable that
explains much of the apparent difference in the impact of legal ori-
gins on financial development. For the last decade, academic theo-
rists have been busily seeking to explain the differing pace of financial
development and economic growth across nations. Although many
theories have been offered, the best known have assigned a leading
role to law and legal origins in their causal story.6 These legal theories
4 Recent surveys find that some foreign firms report themselves as having been
deterred from listing in the United States by Sarbanes-Oxley, but that a distinct subset
of foreign firms is bucking this trend and continuing to cross-list in the United States.
See, e.g., Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow
of International Listings 31 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=956987.
5 Most non-U.S. firms that are eligible to cross-list in the United States have a con-
trolling shareholder, and typically the law in the jurisdiction of incorporation for that
foreign firm permits a controlling shareholder to extract some level of private benefits
from the controlled corporation at the expense of minority shareholders. Doidge et
al., supra note 3, at 3. By entering the U.S. market, the foreign firm likely reduces the
ability of a controlling shareholder to maximize these private benefits of control. See
Craig Doidge, U.S. Cross-Listings and the Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from Dual-
Class Firms, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 519, 550 (2004) (providing empirical evidence of this im-
pact). For a controlling shareholder intent on maximizing its own interests, entry into
the U.S. market by its controlled firm makes sense only if it anticipates either that (1)
the gain in the share value of its own block of shares will exceed the value of the fore-
gone private benefits, or (2) the prospective ability to raise capital in the United States
at lower cost is of greater value to it (typically because of a specific business plan or
strategy) than the foregone private benefits.
6 For the range of theories-some stressing geography, some stressing colonial
endowments, some stressing openness to trade-see infra notes 53-55 and the accom-
panying text. That financial development drives economic growth is itself an idea
whose clear formulation traces back only to the early 1990s. See, e.g., Robert G. King &
Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right, 108 Q.J. ECON. 717, 734-35
(1993). Still, in 1997, four young financial economists-Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, whose work is discussed in
detail in Part I-revolutionized the field by introducing a provocative new thesis that
legal origins were a prime factor in shaping financial development. See Rafael La Porta
et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1149 (1997) (concluding
that legal rules and enforcement impact the size and extent of a country's financial
market). Their work has generated much controversy. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The
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have been controversial, in particular because their-proponents have
been unable to identify any substantive legal differences that appear
to be more than trivial, much less capable of explaining worldwide dif-
ferences in financial development.
This Article does not seek to resolve the causal role of law in fi-
nancial development. More narrowly, it suggests only that one legal
variable-the level of enforcement intensity-distinguishes jurisdic-
tions in a manner that can explain national differences in the cost of
capital (especially between common law and civil law countries) and
the valuation premium that foreign firms cross-listing into the United
States (and only the United States) exhibit. Still, before one can as-
sert that relative enforcement intensity explains differences in finan-
cial development, one must face a complicated question involving the
direction of causality. Here, the deeper issue is: does high enforce-
ment intensity precede or follow financial development? In reality,
enforcement intensity appears to play a dual role: both enhancing
share value for those foreign issuers that do cross-list into a high-
enforcement legal regime and deterring other foreign issuers from
entering high-enforcement jurisdictions. Depending on their goals,
reasonable persons can disagree about whether the best policy re-
sponse is to increase or relax enforcement intensity. As a result, the
issue of the optimal level of enforcement intensity may be the com-
Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 504
(2001) (disagreeing with the claim of La Porta et al. and claiming that "legal origin
does not affect economic growth... through its effect on financial markets");
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Devel-
opment in the Twentieth Century, 69J. FIN. ECON. 5, 14-15 (2003) (finding nations with
civil law origins to have initially led in the race for financial development, but later to
have abandoned the pursuit); Thorsten Beck et al., Law, Politics, and Finance 32 (World
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2585, 2001), available at http://
go.worldbank.org/XOXL5CEGBO (finding a "strong link between financial institution
development and legal origin").
This author has long doubted that law, or at least specific legal rights or provi-
sions, can provide a coherent theory of financial development and has previously ar-
gued that, in the early development of securities markets, the role of substantive law
was less important than the existence of an open, decentralized, and stable political
economy. Investors were protected less by courts than by self-help arrangements in-
volving underwriters and stock exchanges. SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed
Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111
YALE L.J. 1, 8-9 (2001) (arguing that the level of state control over the economy, rather
than the nature of a country's legal system, most influences its financial development).
Strong centrist governments appear to have inhibited the growth of securities markets,
probably because securities markets are less easily controlled than large banks.
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mon link among several ongoing and important debates, which need
to be distinguished at the outset.
First, on the level of contemporary political discourse, a very pub-
lic debate has begun over whether overregulation threatens the
"competitiveness" of the United States' capital markets. The Commit-
tee on Capital Markets Regulation (better known as the Paulson
Committee) issued an interim report in late 2006 concluding "that the
United States is losing its leading competitive position as compared to
stock markets and financial centers abroad., 7 Weeks later, in 2007,
the Paulson Committee's report was followed by a similar study com-
missioned by New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Senator
Charles Schumer and prepared by the consulting firm McKinsey &
Co. 8 Going beyond the usual criticisms of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
both reports found that transactions, listings, and trading volume are
migrating to less intensively regulated securities markets, most notably
those in London and Hong Kong.9 Foreign issuers do not truly avoid
the U.S. capital market, they assert, but instead access it through the
United States' private markets (most notably through the Rule 144A
market), thereby avoiding the public market and most of the SEC's
mandatory disclosure requirements.'0 On this view of the data, Sar-
7 PAULSON REPORT, supra note 1, at ix.
8 BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 1.
9 Particular emphasis is placed on "where new equity capital is being raised-that
is, in which market initial public offerings (IPOs) are being done." PAULSON REPORT,
supra note 1, at ix-x. The Paulson Report found as follows: "As measured by value of
IPOs, the U.S. share declined from 50 percent in 2000 to 5 percent in 2005. Measured
by number of IPOs, the decline is from 37 percent in 2000 to 10 percent in 2005." Id.
at x; see also BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 1, at 10-14. Other studies have
reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Xi Li, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Cross-Listed
Foreign Private Issuers 28 (Jan. 18, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=952433 (finding that foreign private issuers experienced
abnormal declines in stock price of 10%, on average, in response to Sarbanes-Oxley);
Piotroski & Srinivasan, supra note 4, at 33 (" [T] he Sarbanes-Oxley Act has altered the
flow of foreign listings across international exchanges."). At the same time, it should
also be noted that these less intensively regulated markets are experiencing scandals
and a lower rate of growth. AIM, the London Stock Exchange's lightly regulated mar-
ket for smaller companies and IPOs, was slightly down in 2006, and half of its largest
IPOs in 2006 are trading below their initial offering price. Carrick Mollenkamp et al.,
Uncertain AIM. A Hot Market in London Has Its Risks, Too, WALL ST.J., Dec. 20, 2006, at Al.
10 The Paulson Report finds that "[i]n 2005, foreign companies raised 10 times as
much equity in the private U.S. markets as in the public markets ($53.2 billion vs. $4.7
billion)." PAULSON REPORT, supra note 1, at x. It adds that, "of the global IPOs that
raised money in non-U.S. markets, 57 percent of these companies (94 percent of the
capital raised) chose to raise additional capital in the U.S. private markets." Id. Such
funds are raised from large institutional investors pursuant to the exemption from reg-
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banes-Oxley is a deterrent that has made the U.S. capital markets too
costly for those issuers able to opt for other listings. So viewed, over-
regulation appears to be a force that constrains and retards financial
development.
But an alternative view is at least equally plausible. A growing
body of academic research has found that foreign corporations that
do cross-list on a U.S. exchange seem to reap extraordinary benefits:
(1) a valuation premium compared to otherwise similar firms that do
not cross-list in the United States, which at least one study has found
to average 37% for foreign firms cross-listing on a major U.S. ex-
change," and (2) a significant reduction in the cross-listing firm's cost
of capital. 12 Read together, this evidence gives rise to a double mys-
tery: (1) What explains this positive market reaction? (2) Why do
many foreign firms appear to be increasingly spurning a premium
that is not available elsewhere? The most plausible explanation for
istration provided by Rule 144A. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2007) (permitting resale of
privately placed securities to "qualified institutional buyers").
A wave of going-private transactions is, however, also currently causing a number
of delistings from the London Stock Exchange. See Peter Smith & Norma Cohen, De-
listing Wave Hits London, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 2, 2007, at 1 (reporting that the
value of companies taken private broke a record in 2006, with the overall U.K. equities
market shrinking 3% as a result). Thus, it is uncertain whether this new preference for
going private is the product of overregulaion in the United States or the low cost of
capital available to the private equity firms that orchestrate such deals.
11 Craig Doidge et al., Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?, 71J. FIN.
ECON. 205, 206 (2004). Doidge et al. found that foreign companies with shares cross-
listed in the U.S. had Tobin's q ratios that were 16.5% higher (as of the end of 1997)
than the Tobin's q ratios of non-cross-listed firms from the same country. Id. This fig-
ure rises to 37% when the foreign firm cross-listed on a major U.S. exchange (i.e., the
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ). Id. In short, the valuation premium is twice as high over
non-cross-listing firms when the foreign firm lists on a major U.S. exchange. In a later
study, the same authors found the historical average valuation premium over 1990 to
2001 for foreign firms cross-listing onto U.S. exchanges to have been 17.5% over non-
cross-listed firms, and for the period 2002 to 2005 to have been 14.3%. See Doidge et
al., supra note 3, at 33, 62-63 tbl.9. This longer-term study shows both a consistent
premium from 1990 to 2005 for listings on U.S. exchanges and the absence of any
premium for listing on the London Stock Exchange (and indeed a discount for many
years). Id. at 32-33.
12 See Luzi Hail & Chritian Leuz, Cost of Capital Effects and Changes in Growth Expecta-
tions Around U.S. Cross-Listings 36 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working Pa-
per No. 46/2004, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=938230 (finding that,
when non-U.S. companies cross-list on U.S. exchanges, their cost of capital reduces by
70 to 120 basis points); see also Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, InternationalDifferences in the
Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter?, 44 J. ACCT.
RES. 485, 524 tbl.1 (2006) (finding that countries with "more extensive disclosure re-
quirements and stronger securities regulation" exhibit a lower cost of capital).
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the existence of this premium is supplied by the "bonding hypothe-
sis," which explains that by subjecting themselves to the SEC's higher
disclosure standards and the greater prospect of enforcement in the
13United States, foreign firms reduce their agency costs. Although the
finding of a listing premium for the stocks of foreign firms that cross-
list in U.S. markets is now well documented and robust, 14 many re-
main skeptical of the bonding hypothesis, in large measure because
the manner by which foreign firms bond themselves by listing in the
United States remains uncertain.
Even if the source of this premium is uncertain, its absence else-
where is conspicuous-much like Sherlock Holmes' dog that did not
bark in the night. The principal other stock exchange on which for-
eign firms cross-list (namely, the London Stock Exchange) does not
offer any similar valuation premium. 15 Although foreign securities
13 The term "bonding hypothesis" was coined by this author (although others may
have had similar ideas contemporaneously). SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as His-
tory: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93
Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 691-92 (1999) [hereinafter Coffee, The Future as History] ("The
simplest explanation for the migration of foreign issuers to U.S. exchanges and
NASDAQ is that such a listing is a form of bonding .... ); see alsoJohn C. Coffee, Jr.,
Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on Inter-
national Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1757, 1830 (2002) [hereinafter Cof-
fee, Racing Towards the Top] ("Cross-listing may in part be... a bonding mechanism to
assure public investors that they will not be exploited .... "). For other studies, see
William A. Reese Jr. & Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests,
Cross-Listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66J. FIN. ECON. 65, 101-
02 (2002) (finding that post-listing behavior of cross-listing firms corroborated the
bonding hypothesis), and Ren6 M. Stulz, Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of
Capital, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 1999, at 8, 13 (arguing that globalization stimulates
better governance, which lowers the cost of capital). Bonding can occur in a variety of
ways and is not only the product of increased exposure to liability. By entering the
U.S. market, foreign issuers also may expose themselves to the greater scrutiny of secu-
rities analysts and institutional investors and may employ underwriters who perform
greater due diligence. The relative significance of these various means has not yet
been seriously explored. However, the most recent review of the evidence finds that,
although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act "increases the expected reporting, regulatory and
legal costs of a listing on a U.S. exchange," the Act "should strengthen the credibility
of U.S. listings as a bonding mechanism, thus increasing the expected benefits from a
U.S. listing." Piotroski & Srinivasan, supra note 4, at 4. Indeed, Piotroski and Sriniva-
san find that a distinct subset of foreign issuers does cross-list on a U.S. exchange,
rather than on the London Stock Exchange, apparently for these reasons. Id. at 5-7.
14 See sources cited infra note 15 (reviewing studies showing a valuation premium
associated with U.S. cross-listing). For a chart showing the magnitude of this valuation
premium for firms cross-listing in the U.S. market for the years 1997 to 2005, see infra
Figure 12.
15 Doidge et al. have reviewed data covering listings on the major U.S. exchanges
and the London Stock Exchange from 1990 to 2005. At no time over this period do
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markets can compete with U.S. markets by offering increased liquidity
and visibility coupled with less regulation, they seemingly cannot offer
valuation premiums. Nor do they appear to try, as they market their
services instead by stressing that they offer "light" regulation and avoid
imposing additional governance requirements on foreign issuers be-
yond those of the issuer's home jurisdiction. But this only deepens
the mystery. Even if Sarbanes-Oxley did impose significantly increased
costs for internal accounting controls, a valuation premium on the
order of 30% or more would seemingly motivate rational issuers to ac-
16cept very significant transaction costs. To spurn this premium seem-
ingly implies that these issuers are not seeking to maximize the value
of their shares. Does this seem plausible?
This Article's answer is: it all depends on whose self-interest is to
be maximized! Maximizing share value is not the only rational goal,
particularly for a controlling shareholder who does not soon intend to
sell. Although the corporation may have an interest in increasing its
share value, this can be overridden by, for example, (1) the interest of
its controlling shareholders in maintaining unfettered access to the
private benefits of control; (2) a desire to retain business discretion
and flexibility or to avoid specific governance norms required by U.S.
exchanges; or (3) the fear (at least on the part of corporate manag-
ers) of enforcement penalties and the risk of private litigation in the
United States. Simple as this answer sounds, its implication is that the
United States might be the listing venue for higher-quality issuers that
wish to pursue strategic plans that require them to obtain low-cost eq-
uity financing or to bond with their shareholders, while London (and
other markets) instead provides a comfortable refuge for firms with a
control group intent on enjoying either the private benefits of control
or unfettered discretion. The result is a separating equilibrium, as
they find cross-listings on the London Stock Exchange to have been associated with a
listing premium (and often there was a discount), but at all times over this period,
cross-listings on the U.S. exchanges were associated with a listing premium, whose
magnitude varied from time to time. Doidge et al., supra note 3, at 5, 32. Earlier stud-
ies have found that companies cross-listing on the London Stock Exchange did not
outperform a control of non-cross-listing firms from the same jurisdictions (whereas
firms cross-listing in the United States did outperform the control group). See Marco
Pagano et al., The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do Companies List Abroad?, 57J. FIN.
2651, 2684 (2002).
1 The average premium for foreign firms cross-listing to the three major U.S. ex-
changes was 37% in 1997. Doidge et al., supra note 11, at 206. From 2002 to 2005, the
average premium fell to 14%. Doidge et al., supra note 3, at 33.
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some foreign firms list in the United States to bond and others mi-
grate to London to enjoy "business as usual."
17
Of course, this answer may be oversimplified. Corporations could
well prefer to list in London for efficiency-enhancing reasons as well. 8
But to posit such a theory one must explain why the market rewards
only a listing on a U.S. exchange. That there is such a premium and
that it is being spurned by many foreign companies presents a puzzle
that leads one to ask: what is distinctive about the U.S. markets? To
explain the listing premium, economists have tended to focus on dif-
ferences either in disclosure or corporate governance standards.1 9 Al-
17 This author originally advanced the interpretation, in 2002, that securities mar-
kets would compete through specialization by tailoring their markets to different clien-
teles. See Coffee, Racing Towards the Top, supra note 13, at 1798-99. Hence, conver-
gence should not be the norm, at least with respect to securities exchanges and their
listing requirements; rather, competition produces specialization, not convergence.
No suggestion is here intended that the only explanation for why many foreign corpo-
rations prefer to list in London is that controlling shareholders wish to continue to re-
ceive private benefits of control. It is presented as a partial explanation, but not the
exclusive one.
18 Undoubtedly, some foreign corporations list on the London Stock Exchange in
order to avoid what they perceive as inefficient and costly regulation that the United
States imposes on cross-listed firms. Nothing in this Article implies that U.S. enforce-
ment policies are invariably wise orjust, and some rational persons may consider them
often arbitrary and capricious. The market generally may have perceived the impend-
ing enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley in this way. See Piotroski & Srinivasan, supra note 4,
at 2-3 (describing surveys indicating that companies anticipated negative implications
from Sarbanes-Oxley). More particularly, Kate Litvak has found that the stock prices
of non-U.S. companies listed on the major U.S. exchanges declined in comparison to
the stock prices of matching, non-cross-listed companies from the same industry and
country and similar in size. In addition, the decline was more severe for non-U.S.
companies listed on exchanges than for non-U.S. companies that had only made a
more limited entry into the United States via private placements or Rule 144A. Kate
Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxtey Act on Non-U.S. Companies Cross-Listed in the U.S., 13
J. CORP. FIN. 195, 226 (2007) [hereinafter Litvak, The Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley]; see also Li,
supra note 9, at 1-2 (finding negative 10% abnormal stock returns for cross-listed for-
eign companies as a result of the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley); Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-
Oxley and the Cross-Listing Premium, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1857, 1898 (2007) [hereinafter
Litvak, The Cross-Listing Premium] (concluding that, in the period prior to the enact-
ment of Sarbanes-Oxley, the cross-listing premium of foreign companies subject to
Sarbanes-Oxley significantly declined relative to comparable companies not subject to
the same regulation). This research suggests at least that Sarbanes-Oxley and U.S.
regulation were perceived as harmful to investors in foreign firms (and hence lighter
regulation in London was perceived as beneficial). For a further analysis, see infra text
accompanying notes 202-203.
19 Economists have argued not only that improved disclosure reduces uncertainty
and informational asymmetries, but that it can also reduce nondiversifiable risk. For a
brief review of this literature, see Hail & Leuz, supra note 12, at 487. Studies have
found that foreign firms cross-listing on U.S. exchanges do provide superior financial
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though these differences exist, the magnitude of their effect seems
likely to be modest. To be sure, the United Kingdom regulates its is-
suers with a softer touch than does the United States, and in particular
the United Kingdom regulates its foreign issuers much less rigorously
than it regulates its own domestic companies.2 0 But when one focuses
disclosures relative to otherwise similar non-cross-listing firms. See, e.g., Tarun Khanna
et al., Disclosure Practices of Foreign Companies Interacting with U.S. Markets, 42 J. ACCT.
REs. 475, 503 (2004). Others have developed indices to measure differences in the
quality of the corporate governance between cross-listing and non-cross-listing firms,
and have reported that firms cross-listing in the United States (but only in the United
States) rank significantly higher on these indices. See, e.g., GORDON L. CLARK &
DARIUSZ WoJcIK, THE GEOGRAPHY OF FINANCE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 152-54 (2007). This author has no dispute with either asser-
tion, but believes that the enforcement variable may be the underlying force that most
drives issuers to improve their disclosure.
20 The relevant comparison here is not between the general listing standards of
the NYSE and those of the United Kingdom Listing Authority, which is a subsidiary of
the Financial Services Authority (FSA) that adopts the listing standards applicable to
the London Stock Exchange, but rather between the special rules of both bodies that
are applicable to foreign issuers. In the United States, a foreign issuer need not file
periodic disclosure reports with the SEC on a quarterly basis, but need only file an An-
nual Report on Form 20-F (plus copies of its press releases). See Requirements of An-
nual Reports, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2007); Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and Form
10-QSB, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (2007); SEC Form 20-F, available at http://
www.sec.gov/about/forms/form20-f.pdf. This is the only major concession that the
SEC makes to foreign issuers. For example, section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires
even the foreign issuer to have an independent audit committee. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1 (m) (3) (2000 & Supp. III 2004).
By contrast, in the United Kingdom, the listing rules applicable to foreign issuers
are considerably more relaxed than those applicable to domestic issuers. With respect
to domestic issuers, the FSA goes well beyond the minimum standards required by the
major European Commission directives and requires "super-equivalency" for U.K. do-
mestic issuers; that is, U.K. domestic companies are required to meet "gold-plated"
standards to provide investor protection. But these same standards do not apply to
most foreign issuers. For example, the FSA's Listing Rules subject domestic companies
to special rules with regard to related party transactions, and to the United Kingdom's
"comply or explain" disclosure standards for corporate governance. See FSA, FSA
Handbook: Listing Rules R. 9.25, 9.26, 11.1 (Nov. 2007), http://fsahandbook.info/
FSA//handbook/LR.pdf [hereinafter U.K. Listing Rules]. However, the Listing Rules
require far less of a foreign company that applies for a secondary listing of its equity
securities-and most foreign issuers apply for such a secondary listing (based on hav-
ing a primary listing in their home country). See generally id. at R. 9.1.1 (confining the
application of the disclosure rules to companies with primary listings); id. at R. 11.1.1
(confining the related party rules to companies with primary listings). Rule 14 of the
U.K. Listing Rules covers these companies, id. at R. 14.1, and thus the U.K. Listing
Rules governing preemptive rights, Rules 9.3.11 and 9.3.12, are inapplicable to such
"overseas listed companies." See id. at R. 9.3.11, 9.3.12. In general, the provisions of
the U.K. Listing Rules seeking to protect minority shareholders do not apply to "over-
seas listed companies" with a secondary listing. See lain MacNeil & Alex Lau, Interna-
tional Corporate Regulation: Listing Rules and Overseas Companies, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
2007]
240 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYL VANIA LA W REVIEW
on the actual differences-for example, the exemption of most for-
eign issuers from the United Kingdom's "comply or explain" disclo-
sure policies regarding corporate governance and also from the
United Kingdom's Takeover Code-it is implausible that they could
account for more than a marginal difference in valuations or for the
enormous disparity in Tobin's q ratios found in recent studies. 2' Al-
ternatively, the bonding premium might be explained by the higher
level of scrutiny that firms cross-listed in the United States receive
from securities analysts, underwriters, and institutional investors. But
these same gatekeepers are also present in London. Thus, to explain
the valuation premium that is associated with a U.S. listing and con-
spicuously absent from a London listing, one is compelled to assign at
least considerable weight to the variable of enforcement. Here, as this
Article will demonstrate, the disparity is large. Indeed, simply the
failure of the United Kingdom to effectively enforce its own insider
trading restrictions (as later discussed) could alone plausibly account
for a significant portion of this difference.22 In addition, because even
787, 803-05 (2001) (noting that preemption rights do not apply to overseas companies
listed on the London Stock Exchange). Such overseas-listed companies with a secon-
dary listing on the London Stock Exchange are required only to (1) maintain a listing
in a recognized market, U.K. Listing Rules, supra, at R. 14.3.1, (2) ensure that a mini-
mum proportion of shares remain in public hands, id. at R. 14.2.2, 14.3.2, (3) seek list-
ings for further tranches of securities of the same class as listed, id. at R. 14.3.4, and (4)
provide certain documents and notifications to the FSA, id. at R. 3.3.2-3.3.7. In addi-
tion, overseas-listed companies are not subject to the City Code on Takeovers and
Mergers promulgated by The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. See THE PANEL ON
TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE TAKEOVER CODE, at A3-A5 (8th ed. 2006), available at
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/new/codesars/DATA%5Ccode.pdf. This differ-
ential in regulation has produced some recent concern in the United Kingdom that
foreign firms are regulated too lightly. SeeJill Treanor, Fears Over Light-Touch Regulation
of Foreign Firms, GuARDIAN (U.K), Feb. 23, 2007, at 33 (describing fears associated with
having "less stringent" regulation of foreign firms).
Otherwise, both the SEC and the FSA observe disclosure standards that comply
with the standards of the International Organization of Securities Commission
(IOSCO), which were first adopted in 1990. The SEC does go marginally beyond the
IOSCO standards, and its accounting rules are also different. See Roberta S. Karmel,
Will Convergence of Financial Disclosure Standards Change SEC Regulation of Foreign Issuers?,
26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 485, 492-94 (2000). But which country's accounting rules are
currently more rigorous is open to debate.
21 See supra notes 11, 15, 16, and accompanying text (surveying studies that show a
higher Tobin's q ratio for firms cross-listed in the United States).
Insider trading does appear to be relatively pervasive on the London Stock Ex-
change and to have increased significantly between 2000 and 2004. Nuno Monteiro et
al., Updated Measurement of Market Cleanliness 20 tbl.8 (FSA, Occasional Paper Series,
Paper No. 25, 2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/op25.pdf.
This report further found that "no major enforcement action had taken place in the
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domestic U.K. firms show a higher Tobin's q ratio when they cross-list
in the United States,23 the lighter, softer-touch regulation that the Fi-
nancial Services Authority (FSA) accords foreign firms cannot explain
why U.K- domestic firms also trade at a premium when they cross-list
in the United States.
Rarely have the evidence and the rhetoric about securities regula-
tion been more irreconcilable. If one listens to the rhetoric, the one
formal legal difference between the U.S. and the U.K- markets that
has received the most analysis and debate has been the more costly
accounting controls mandated in the United States by section 404 of
24the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. But if these additional costs are wasteful (as
much commentary has suggested 2 5), the valuation premium should
period under examination." Id. at 4. Other research has found that the prevalence of
insider trading does measurably affect the cost of equity capital, widening bid/asked
spreads and reducing liquidity. Moreover, enforcement of insider trading laws appears
to reduce the cost of equity capital. See Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World
Price of Insider Trading, 57J. FIN. 75, 78 (2002) (arguing that the enforcement of insider
trading laws, rather than their mere existence, leads to "a significant decrease in the
cost of equity").
23 Between 1990 and 2005, some 129 U.K. issuers (i.e., domestic U.K. companies)
cross-listed onto a U.S. exchange, whereas only 17 U.S. issuers cross-listed onto the
London Stock Exchange's Main Market. Doidge et al., supra note 3, at 52-53 tbl.3.
The foregoing authors have also provided this author with a country-by-country com-
parison of the cross-listing premiums for the year 2005. In 2005, they compared 479
U.K. firms that were not cross-listed with 74 U.K. firms that were cross-listed. The for-
mer had a Tobin's q of 1.65, and the latter a Tobin's q of 1.95, which went up to 2.05
for exchange-listed U.K. firms. Doidge et al., Chart of Tobin's qValues (2005) (on file
with author).
24 Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2000 & Supp.
III 2004), requires the corporation's management to assess in the corporation's annual
report "the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer
for financial reporting" and its auditor to "attest to, and report on, the assessment
made by the management of the issuer." In Auditing Standard No. 2, the Public Com-
pany Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued detailed rules that required the
auditor to undertake a full-scale audit in making this "assessment" and to find that the
corporation had a "material weakness" if there was more than a "remote" prospect of a
financial restatement. AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING
PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, Auditing
Standard No. 2, 1 4, 9 (PCAOB 2007). Auditing Standard No. 2 proved to be very
costly and was significantly revised in 2006. For an overview, see Management's Report
on Internal Control over Financial Reporting, Securities Act Release No. 8762, Ex-
change Act Release No. 54,976, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,635 (Dec. 27, 2006).
25 As the Paulson Report noted, critics have estimated that section 404 gave rise to
compliance costs that totaled between $15 and $20 billion in 2004. See PAULSON RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 115. This was based in turn on studies by Financial Executives
International and Charles River Associates that placed the average cost per company in
2004 at $4.36 million or between $1.24 million and $8.51 million, depending on the
size of the company. Id. at 126.
2007]
242 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW
attach instead to a London listing, not a New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) listing. Moreover, whatever Sarbanes-Oxley did or did not do,
it cannot be used to explain trends and developments that began well
before its passage. As discussed later, declines in both the valuation
premium and the presence of foreign issuers in the U.S. markets did
occur, but these declines began well before the passage of Sarbanes-
26Oxley.
At this point, this Article's thesis crystallizes: disparities in en-
forcement may be able to explain what marginal differences in formal
legal rules or disclosure standards cannot explain. This thesis that en-
forcement intensity affects the cost of capital also intersects with a
second major debate: what factors best explain financial develop-
ment? Once again, intensity of enforcement may be the factor that
best distinguishes the United States from other international market
centers and that explains the interconnected phenomena of issuer
flight from the United States and the valuation premium assigned to
those foreign firms that do enter the United States. Although finan-
cial economics has (belatedly) become interested in the impact of le-
gal rules on financial development, most of this research has focused
on the common law versus the civil law in general, with little attention
being given to the possibility of "American exceptionalism." Because
of this preoccupation with finding differences between countries with
common law origins and those with civil law origins, researchers have
missed the striking fact that the United States is an outlier, differing as
much from other common law countries as they in turn do from civil
law countries.
The modern debate over the causes of financial development es-
sentially began in the late 1990s, when a talented team of financial
economists-known universally today as LLS&V27-reported that
countries with common law legal origins experienced rapid financial
development, while countries with civil law origins did not. It is an
understatement to say that these findings generated controversy. Un-
der the LLS&V interpretation, small and (to lawyers) inconsequential
legal differences were assigned great weight and presented as the mi-
26 See infra notes 183-186 and accompanying text. The decline began in 2000, con-
tinued in 2001, and hit bottom in 2002, the year that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was
passed.
27 LLS&V stands for Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer,
and Robert W. Vishny. Their most cited article is probably Rafael La Porta et al., Law
and Finance, 106J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). Their first paper to state their common
law origins thesis was La Porta et al., supra note 6.
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nority shareholders' shield against exploitation by the majority.
2 s
Others joined in this search to find the hidden legal rules that facili-
tate financial development, and at times this inquiry resembled the
medieval quest for the philosopher's stone that could turn lead into
gold.
Nonetheless, the intent of this quest was far from silly. It was (and
is) logical to believe that there are legal preconditions to financial de-
velopment. As LLS&V posited, financial development requires not
only that property rights be respected and contracts enforced, but also
that investors and minority shareholders be protected against exploi-
tation by controlling shareholders. Initially, LLS&V asserted that the
common law accomplished this, vastly outperforming the civil law in
encouraging financial development, with French civil law performing
particularly poorly. 9
Provocative and polarizing as this conclusion was, LLS&V were less
successful at identifying the specific legal rights that fostered minority
protection and hence financial development. Although their core
idea that there must be an institutional and legal basis for economic
development has gained wide acceptance, they have persuaded few as
to the identity of the specific legal rights critical to financial development.
Why has the search for significant legal differences proven so elu-
sive? Here, this Article intersects with a third debate: in studying the
differences between legal systems, on what should one focus? LLS&V
28 LLS&V developed an "antidirector rights" index of shareholder protection
rules, based on data from forty-nine countries, to serve as a measure of legal protection
for minority shareholder rights. See La Porta et al., supra note 27, at 1127-29. Only six
factors were included in this index: "[p]roxy by mail allowed," "[s]hares not blocked
before meeting," "[c]umulative voting or proportional representation," "[o]ppressed
minorities mechanism," "[p]reemptive rights," and "[p]ercentage of share capital to
call an extraordinary shareholders' meeting." Id. at 1122-23 tbl.1. Corporate lawyers
would generally view several of these protections as having only modest value; for ex-
ample, preemptive rights and cumulative voting are generally dispensed with in the
United States. Some critics have also charged that LLS&V obtained their results by
inconsistent coding of these variables. See, e.g., Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance
and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al. 's "Anti-Director Rights Index" Under Consistent Coding
68 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus. Fellows' Discussion Paper Series, Discus-
sion Paper No. 7, 2006), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
olincenter/fellows.papers/pdf/Spamann7.pdf (finding that after recoding LLS&V's
data, "there is ... very little reason to think that the [antidirector rights index] validly
measures legal shareholder protection").
29 For a concise summary, see Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins,
117 Q.J. ECON. 1193, 1194 (2002) ("On just about any measure, common law countries
are more financially developed than civil law countries." (citing La Porta et al., supra
note 6, at 1149; La Porta et al., supra note 27, at 1151)).
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have largely focused on substantive doctrinal differences (i.e., the "law
on the books"), but others have urged looking at the law in operation,
and particularly at enforcement. 0 Agreeing with this latter view, this
Article will suggest that a leading difference between civil and com-
mon law systems and also between the United States and the rest of
the world over much of the last century has been enforcement inten-
sity. This difference was hardly hidden and might have been detected
by researchers early on, but was missed, largely because of most re-
searchers' steadfast focus on "law on the books"-that is, on formal
and substantive legal rules. Understandably, formal legal rules are
easier for economists to code, measure, and incorporate into their re-
gression equations, but they may have little to do with the reality of ac-
tual practice, particularly in developing countries.
In fairness, students of economic development, including LLS&V,
have begun to shift their attention to enforcement: 3' Are rules and
rights enforced in actual practice, and at what cost? How significant is
the deterrent threat to those who might violate a legal rule? Although
these are better questions than "what does the law on the books say?"
enforcement can be measured in very different ways. Unfortunately,
LLS&V chose, once again, to measure enforcement largely in terms of
a formal statutory analysis, focusing on the legal status and powers of
the securities regulators in different countries. 2 In so doing, they
continued to focus on the more easily measured "law on the books."
Yet, even if a regulator is endowed with great power and authority (as
our analysis of the FSA will show), it might use little of that power.
Why? Possibly, it may still lack an adequate budget to be effective; al-
ternatively, it may be constrained by political forces, or it may simply
be disinclined to employ its powers, preferring to enjoy the quiet life.
In contrast, this Article seeks to measure enforcement by focusing
on inputs and outputs: What was the size of the regulator's budget
30 At least one economic study has departed from this focus on the "law on the
books" and indeed found that it is the enforcement, not the enactment, of statutes that
yields measurable results. See Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 22, at 104 (finding
that actual prosecutions for insider trading did reduce the cost of capital in ajurisdic-
tion, but that the passage of an insider trading law did not).
31 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1, 27
(2006) ("[S]ecurities laws matter because they facilitate private contracting rather than
provide for public regulatory enforcement.").
3 As discussed infra in notes 44-48 and the accompanying text, this is the ap-
proach taken in La Porta et al., supra note 31, at 11-13, which evaluates enforcement in
terms of the power and independence of the securities regulator, but contains no data
on budgets or prosecutions.
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and staff in comparison to some objective, market-adjusted bench-
mark (such as market capitalization or gross domestic product)? How
many enforcement actions were actually brought in the jurisdiction
(both in absolute numbers and again on a market-adjusted basis)?
What penalties were imposed? These data are less easily assembled,
but preliminary attempts at cross-country measurement of enforce-
ment efforts have now been conducted. What they show are two out-
standing and unambiguous facts:
(1) Common law and civil law countries differ markedly in their
regulatory intensity, with the former expending vastly greater
resources on enforcement by any measurement standard.
(2) In terms of actual enforcement actions brought and sanctions
levied, the United States is an outlier, which, even on a mar-
ket-adjusted basis, imposes financial penalties that dwarf those
of any other jurisdiction.
The United States is exceptional in other ways as well. In the
United States, public enforcement of law is supplemented by a vigor-
ous, arguably even hyperactive, system of private enforcement. Rely-
ing on class actions and an entrepreneurial plaintiffs' bar motivated
by contingent fees, the U.S. system of private "enforcement by bounty
hunter" appears in fact to exact greater annual aggregate sanctions
than do its public enforcers. This system has no true functional ana-
logue anywhere else in the world. 3 Finally, the United States prose-
cutes securities offenses criminally-and does so systematically. 4  In
contrast, even in the United Kingdom and even in the case of core of-
fenses such as insider trading, criminal sanctions appear to be rarely
invoked.
How then do the pieces of this puzzle fit together? Arguably, the
greater institutional commitment of the United States to enforce-
ment-administered by multiple and often competing enforcers, pri-
vate and public-may be the underlying motor force that explains
33 Canada and Australia come the closest because they have authorized class ac-
tion-like proceedings. Securities class actions covering the secondary market in Can-
ada date only from December 31, 2005. Philip Anisman & Garry Watson, Some Com-
parisons Between Class Actions in Canada and the U.S.: Securities Class Actions, Certification,
and Costs, 3 CAN. CLAss ACTION REv. 467, 499 (2006); see also id. at 468 (noting Can-
ada's recent authorization of class action-like proceedings). Class actions have been
authorized for a longer period in Australia, but initially there was only a "low level[] of
interest," which gradually increased over the last decade. See Bernard Murphy &
Camille Cameron, Access to Justice and the Evolution of Class Action Litigation in Australia,
30 MELB. U. L. REv. 399,400 (2006).
34 See infra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
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both the bonding hypothesis and the reluctance of some foreign issu-
ers to enter the United States, even if they thereby fail to maximize
their share value. The deterrent threat generated by the U.S. com-
mitment to enforcement does not, however, affect all foreign issuers
equally. Rather, it will disproportionately repel particular classes of
issuers: most notably, those with controlling shareholders who find it
more advantageous to consume the private benefits of control them-
selves than to maximize their firm's share price. In contrast, compa-
nies with attractive investment or merger opportunities, but requiring
either equity capital or listed stock that can be used as a currency for
acquisitions, may prefer to bond themselves and thereby lower their
cost of capital.
As a result, while competition is often thought to lead to conver-
gence, competition among securities exchanges may instead lead not
to uniformity, but to increased specialization. That is, some ex-
changes (most notably in the United States) will offer the valuation
premiums and cost-of-capital reductions that strong enforcement en-
courages, while other exchanges (most notably outside the United
States) may attract foreign listings by offering lighter regulation. Al-
though lighter regulation would not improve the cross-listing firm's
cost of capital, such exchanges could still attract foreign issuers by of-
fering heightened liquidity and visibility without impeding their con-
trolling shareholders' enjoyment of private benefits. The problematic
bottom line here could be that the policies that maximize the private
35wealth of the exchanges could minimize social wealth for the nation.
As is by now obvious, this Article will cut across a variety of de-
bates, conducted on a variety of levels. To set the stage, Part I will be-
gin with a summary of the voluminous debate over the LLS&V thesis
that the common law outperforms the civil law. Part II will then turn
to the evidence that common law and civil law systems do diverge sig-
35 This is said more with regard to foreign exchanges that are seeking to attract
foreign listings through low-intensity enforcement. However, U.S. exchanges may also
be seeking to outflank the stricter legal controls imposed on them by U.S. law by ac-
quiring foreign exchanges that are beyond the reach of U.S. regulators. The NYSE has
merged with Euronext, N.V., the largest European exchange, but a condition of this
merger was that Euronext would remain subject to European regulation. Meanwhile,
NASDAQ is pursuing a merger candidate, having failed to acquire the London Stock
Exchange. Some commentators believe that a motive underlying these acquisition ef-
forts is to induce the SEC to modify its rules so as to harmonize them with those in
Europe. See, e.g., Rying in Formation, ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 2007, at 76, 77 (noting that
recent merger activity "has encouraged American and British regulators to co-operate
more closely").
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nificantly in their approach to enforcement. Part III will examine the
evidence supporting the bonding hypothesis and the significance of
recent fluctuations in the cross-listing premium. The Paulson Report,
for instance, argues that the valuation premium incident to a U.S. list-
ing has recently declined and suggests that it is a response to Sar-
banes-Oxley.3 The data, however, show that most (and possibly all) of
this decline preceded Sarbanes-Oxley, and listing premiums are again
stable and possibly increasing. Part IV will move to the more abstract
level of political economy to ask: what factors explain the significant
variation across countries in the level of enforcement activity? Finally,
Part V will return to the policy level: What options are feasible for
U.S. policy makers? Can we disaggregate the concept of enforcement
and find contexts where less might be better?
I. THE LEGAL ORIGINS DEBATE
Our story begins with the work of LLS&V. Prior to their trailblaz-
ing articles in 1997 and 1998, it was already accepted that a strong fi-
nancial sector acted as an engine of economic growth.3' But LLS&V
redirected this research by focusing on "legal origins." Using a sample
of some forty-nine countries, they found a statistically significant rela-
tionship between the origins of a country's laws and its level of finan-
cial development. 39 Dividing the world into three categories of legal
36 PAULSON REPORT, supra note 1, at 47-48.
37 See infra note 184 and accompanying text (evaluating the average Tobin's q of
non-cross-listed firms along with the cross-listing premium on U.S. exchanges).
Doidge et al. dispute that the U.S. listing premium declined after the passage of Sar-
banes-Oxley. Doidge et al., supra note 3, at 39. Others, including Kate Litvak and
Luigi Zingales, disagree. See Litvak, The Cross-Listing Premium, supra note 18, at 1898
(noting a significant decline in the U.S. listing premium in 2002, particularly for high-
profit firms); Litvak, The Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 18, at 226 (finding that
events leading to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley triggered drops in the stock prices
of cross-listed companies); Luigi Zingales, Is the US. Capital Market Losing Its Competitive
Edge? 13-14 (Univ. of Chi. Graduate Sch. of Bus. Initiative on Global Mkts., Working
Paper No. 1, 2006), available at http://research.chicagogsb.edu/igm/research/
papers/]LZingalescompetitiveness.pdf (concluding that after Sarbanes-Oxley was
passed, the U.S. listing premium dropped especially significantly for companies from
countries with good corporate governance). No position is taken here on this empiri-
cal issue.
38 See, e.g., King & Levine, supra note 6, at 719; Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock
Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, 88 AM. EcON. REv. 537, 538 (1998).
s9 La Porta et al., supra note 27, at 1151. This methodology has attracted consid-
erable criticism. The most amusing of these critiques has been offered by Professor
Mark West. See Mark D. West, Legal Determinants of World Cup Success (John M. Olin
Ctr. for Law & Econ., Paper No. 02-009, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/
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origins-common law, German and Scandinavian civil law, and
French civil law-they ranked the common law countries first and
French civil law countries last. According to their findings, common
law origin countries had grown at a faster rate (4.3% per capita) than
French civil law origin countries (3.2% per capita) .4
But what does a country that has an inferior "legal origin" do? Is
it condemned for eternity to a limbo of limited financial develop-
ment? By 2000, LLS&V were ready to move from diagnosis to pre-
scription and offer advice to policy planners. They wrote that "the
evidence on the importance of the historically determined legal origin
in shaping investor rights... suggests at least tentatively that many
rules need to be changed simultaneously to bring a country with poor
investor protection up to best practice."4' In short, civil law origin
countries should quickly convert to common law corporate govern-
ance rules.
But can the leopard change its spots simply by means of legislative
reform? If the common law is superior to the civil law, one must ask
what the key characteristics of the common law are. The usual, if
oversimplified, answer is that the common law is judge-made, while
the civil law is legislatively derived. If so, then legislative reform of a
civil law jurisdiction's corporate and bankruptcy laws could hardly es-
tablish the same strong English tradition of independent judges, able
to resist the other branches of government in defense of property
rights. Thus, it is debatable whether the LLS&V prescription truly fol-
lows from their research.
At this point, the question of what is being measured becomes
even more tangled. LLS&V primarily focused on the substantive legal
protections afforded to minority shareholders and creditors. But,
abstract=318940. He argues that "if factors such as 'rule of law' and legal origin mat-
ter, they might also matter in other areas of human endeavor," such as success in soc-
cer. Id. at 2. Using primary independent variables identical to the ones used by
LLS&V in their 1997 regressions (among which are legal origin and rule of law) and
basing his study on the same forty-nine countries, Professor West controls for the num-
ber of professional soccer players per capita, whereas LLS&V controlled for GDP
growth and the logarithm of real GNP. Id. at 3. He discusses the possibility that teams
from countries based on the French civil law system are likely to play better football,
because, where "vestiges of the Napoleonic Code" survive, discretion is typically re-
moved from "coaches and managers in the same manner that that civil law system cur-
tails judicial activism." Id. at 5. However, he concedes that "maybe-just maybe-
other forces are at work." Id. at 5.
40 La Porta et al., supra note 6, at 1138 tbl.II.
41 Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58J. FIN. ECON.
3, 20 (2000).
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even in common law systems, these bodies of law are primarily statu-
tory, and relatively little room is left for judicial lawmaking-the sup-
posed defining characteristic of common law.42 Ironically, it is the
most statutory (and thus civil law-like) aspects of corporate govern-
ance in common law countries whose value the LLS&V research seems
to affirm.
LLS&V also gave relatively little attention to the issue of enforce-
ment. In Law and Finance, their most cited paper, they purport to
consider what they call "enforcement variables"; but, by this term, they
mean more generalized factors describing the legal environment,
such as "the efficiency of the judicial system" and the "rule of law."
4 3
But they never consider measures of enforcement inputs (such as
budget or staff size) or measures of enforcement output (such as ac-
tions brought or penalties levied). Such data are not easily available,
whereas more generalized measures (such as efficiency ratings) can be
conveniently borrowed from ratings by independent organizations.
Nonetheless, what is most easily measured is not necessarily what
is most relevant. Take, for example, using measures of judicial cor-
ruption as a proxy for strong enforcement. In some legal systems
(such as Germany and Scandinavia) judges are recruited early in their
careers and are trained and promoted within a judicial bureaucracy.
Instances of corruption in such a system are exceedingly rare. In con-
trast, in the United States, judges in state courts are largely elected,
and they therefore need to raise funds through political contribu-
tions. Worse still, in some states,judicial candidates come from within
political machines, with their loyalty to the machine being a prime cri-
terion for advancement. Not surprisingly, the danger of corruption is
nontrivial in U.S. state courts. This evidence says little, however,
about the level of enforcement. In Germany and Scandinavia, the
courts may be pure and unconflicted, but neither prosecutors nor pri-
vate plaintiffs may have sufficient incentive or budgets to bring en-
forcement actions. Thus, enforcement intensity was an issue that
LLS&V missed by instead focusing on judicial independence and in-
tegrity.
42 For this criticism, see Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, The Political Economy of
Corporate Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REv. 1005, 1006 (2005) (noting that the possibility
of "reforms of corporate law" contradicts the premise of the legal origin theory). For
the same critique (and others), see KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAw-GROWTH NEXus: THE
RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT 32-33 (2006).
43 La Porta et al., snpra note 27, at 1142 tbl.1, 1140.
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In a 2006 paper, What Works in Securities Laws?, the first three au-
thors of the LLS&V quartet did examine the issue of enforcement in
more detail,4 but again failed to incorporate data about enforcement
inputs or outputs. Instead, they developed a public enforcement in-
dex based on formal characteristics of the regulator, assigning weight
to such factors as the regulator's independence from the executive
branch, its investigative powers, its capacity to impose civil sanctions,
and the range of criminal sanctions available. 45  These individual
weights were then added to generate a comparative index of public
enforcement. 46 Ignored by all this is the possibility of a lazy, corrupt,
or incompetent regulator who has broad formal powers but does
nothing in fact. Interestingly, the three authors found that their in-
dex for public enforcement did not correlate well with their measures
of financial development. 7 Accordingly, they reached the breathtak-
ingly overbroad conclusion that public enforcement was relatively un-
important (at least in comparison to private enforcement) to the de-
velopment of securities markets.48
Any attempt to summarize all of the methodological criticisms
leveled at LLS&V could fill an entire article that would be much
longer than this one. Still, the principal objections raised by critics
include the following:
(1) Although French inefficiency is assumed, France in fact ex-
perienced greater economic growth than the United Kingdom
44 La Porta et al., supra note 31, at 11-13.
45 In analyzing public enforcement, the three authors "focus on five broad aspects
of public enforcement." Id. at 12. First, they evaluate the "attributes" of the securities
regulator: Who appoints its members? Can they be removed by a higher authority?
Does it focus on securities markets alone? Does it have the "power to regulate primary
offerings and/or listing rules on stock exchanges"? Id. Second, they determine
whether the power to regulate is "delegated to the [regulator], rather than re-
main[ing] with the legislature or the Ministry of Finance." Id. Third, they rate the
"investigative powers" of the securities regulator: can it subpoena documents and wit-
nesses? Id. Fourth, they evaluate the civil sanctions that the regulator can levy. Id.
Finally, they examine the criminal penalties that are authorized and rank the regulator
in terms of the severity of these penalties. Id. at 12-13. Although they find that securi-
ties regulators in common law countries have both more extensive investigative powers
and harsher criminal and noncriminal sanctions, id. at 15-16 tbl.II, which seems cor-
rect, they never assess or attempt to measure if these powers are actually used.
46 Id. at 13.
47 Id. at 19-20.
48 Id. at 20.
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over most of the period since 1820. 49 French civil law seems,
then, to have worked adequately, at least for France.
(2) The data supporting the conclusion that common law coun-
tries have economically outperformed civil law countries are
largely driven by the spectacular economic failure of Latin
America over the prior century, but whether Latin America
should be deemed to be of French civil law origin is highly
debatable.5 °
(3) The LLS&V coding system is suspect, with some critics charg-
ing that it has been inconsistently applied.'
(4) Vivid counterexamples can be given of both economies that
have developed rapidly from civil law origins and others that
have stagnated notwithstanding their common law origins. 2
(5) Many doubt that law ranks anywhere near as high as structural
factors, such as geography,53 openness to trade, 4 or colonial
endowments,5" in explaining postcolonial economic growth;
from this perspective, the failure of French civil law was more
the product of its adoption in too many tropical climates
(whereas the common law found its way to adoption in health-
ier, more temperate regions).
Still, to the extent that law does matter, the most telling criticism
of LLS&V may be that they ignore public law, focusing almost exclu-
sively on private law. As this author has previously argued, the first se-
curities markets developed more or less contemporaneously in Am-
49 For a summary of evidence on this point, see DAM, supra note 42, at 38-39.
The Napoleonic influence over Latin America was short-lived, while the U.S.
influence may have had a far longer duration. See id. at 42-45.
51 See, e.g., Spamann, supra note 28, at 1 (reviewing criticisms of LLS&V's coding
method); id. at 19-20 ("For example, . . . both Norway and the U.S. have cumulative
voting only as an optional rule, but ... La Porta et al. coded Norway as 0 and the U.S.
as 1 for that variable... (citing La Porta et al., supra note 27)).
52 For instance, South Korea, Japan, China, and Costa Rica have civil law origins
(largely Germanic), while some of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g.,
Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria) have common law origins.
53 See generally JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN
SOCIETIES (1997). A dominant theme of this analysis is that tropical countries faced
severe health problems that limited economic development and limited the effort
made to direct capital to them. Id. at 28-32.
5 See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 6, at 21-23 (arguing that free trade discourages
dominant industries from seeking to block development of securities markets).
55 See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development:
An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1372-73 (2001) (emphasizing the
impact of colonial conditions, rather than legal origins, on economic performance).
2007]
252 UNIVERSITY OF PENNS YL VANIA LA W REVIEW
sterdam and London, the former in a civil law country and the latter
56in the archetypal common law country. What was critical to their
origins in both countries was the open, pluralistic, and decentralized
nature of the society in which they took root, in particular the absence
of a dominant centralized bureaucracy that exercised control over all
significant economic initiatives. 57 In England, at the time when the
first securities market arose, an entrepreneur could, over the course
of a career, open a brewery, expand it, and grow rich (and ultimately
be knighted for his success), all without the intervention or approval
of any state bureaucracy."s In contrast, on the Continent, strong statist
bureaucracies (particularly in France) might have required the same
entrepreneur to secure their favor and approval. Although England
and France may have been poles apart in this regard, the difference
was not their private law, but their public law-the degree of eco-
nomic freedom and authority that they gave the entrepreneur. The
absence of an overarching, centralized bureaucracy in England and
the Netherlands at the time that both witnessed the first appearance
of securities markets cannot be attributed to their private law, but
rather to their public law that (1) had already strengthened the posi-
tion of the merchant middle class and made them relatively inde-
56 See Coffee, supra note 6, at 61-62 (explaining that the emergence of stock ex-
changes in Amsterdam and London was "neither accidental nor unrelated to the ear-
lier appearance of a pluralistic society").
57 See id. at 61-62 (arguing, in part, that self-regulation was more easily accepted in
common law countries). For a similar and very detailed assessment of English culture
and its shared characteristics with Dutch culture of the same era, see ALAN
MACFARLANE, THE RIDDLE OF THE MODERN WORLD: OF LIBERTY, WEALTH AND EQUAL-
ITY 280-85 (2000).
58 By the early 1600s, English popular culture had originated and celebrated the
"rags to riches" story of the poor boy who, through diligence and perspicacity, rose
from poverty to great wealth and power. The classic such story was the children's tale
of Dick Whittington and his cat, in which the feline famously advised the boy appren-
tice to return to London and not give up. The 400th anniversary of this folktale was
duly celebrated in 2005. See Symposium, The Power of Stories: Intersections of Law, Litera-
ture, and Culture, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 1 (2005). This folktale was based on an
actual historical figure, Sir Richard Whittington, who rose from the status of a poor
apprentice to become a wealthy cloth merchant and eventually Lord Mayor of Lon-
don. See Susanna Frederick Fischer, Dick Whittington and Creativity: From Trade to Folk-
lore, From Folklore to Trade, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 5, 9-13 (2005). Folktales do not
prove that such careers were common, but they do reveal that the popular imagination
wanted to believe in, and was captured by, such stories. Three centuries later, the U.S.
equivalent of the Dick Whittington story was the Horatio Alger story; again, at least on
occasion, men such as Andrew Carnegie did achieve great wealth and power based on
their individual entrepreneurial skill. Similar stories from the same era are much
harder to identify on the Continent.
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pendent of any absolutist monarch, (2) encouraged decentralization
and self-regulation, and (3) tolerated and encouraged individual ini-
tiatives.5
At their outset, securities markets were autonomous and self-
regulating. Not until the late nineteenth century (in the United
Kingdom) and the early twentieth century (in the United States) was
securities regulation enacted to control these markets. That they
were granted such autonomy is, of course, a function of the basic po-
litical economy of the broader society in which they were embedded.
Above all, individual autonomy was the norm. This preference for
autonomy cannot be explained as the product of legal origins, but
only in terms of the broader structure of these societies. As Max We-
ber long ago recognized, one must look beyond narrow legal rules to
the more fundamental conceptions that differentiated Protestant
from Catholic Europe and strongly centralized states from constitu-
tional democracies"
All that said, LLS&V still deserve much credit for recognizing the
arresting fact that financial development seems to have occurred ear-
lier and more easily in common law countries than in civil law ones.
But what else distinguishes these rival systems besides their legal ori-
gins? At this point, it is necessary to move away from the simplifying
assumption that the world can be divided into a simple dichotomy of
common law versus civil law.
59 For more on these themes, see MACFARLANE, supra note 57, at 280-90, and Cof-
fee, supra note 6, at 61-63.
CO In the United Kingdom, the Directors Liability Act of 1890 liberalized the law of
deceit (and was later copied by the Securities Act of 1933). See Securities Act of 1933
§ 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000) (making "fraud or deceit" unlawful "in the offer or
sale of any securities"); I LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 7 (4th ed. 2006)
(noting that the Directors Liability Act imposed "civil liability for untrue statements in
the prospectus without proof of scienter" (citing Directors Liability Act, 53 & 54 Vict.,
c. 64)). In the United States, "blue sky" statutes were enacted in most states to govern
securities transactions, beginning with a comprehensive Kansas statute in 1911. Id. at
53. By 1933, blue sky statutes had been enacted in 47 states and Hawaii. Id. at 58. For
a fuller discussion of how U.S. securities markets developed prior to the existence of
any comprehensive law governing securities transactions, see Coffee, supra note 6, at
25-39.
61 For a representative account of Weber's view of the relationship between law
and economic growth, see David M. Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capital-
ism, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 720, 739-48. Weber, however, regarded the common law itself as
backward and resistant to systematization. 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIEIY 657
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
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II. THE COMPARATIVE RESEARCH ON ENFORCEMENT
If differences in substantive legal rules seem unlikely to explain
the gap between civil and common law countries in terms of the de-
velopment of their securities markets, an obvious alternative theory is
that countries with more developed markets may invest more in moni-
toring and regulating them. That is, countries could have relatively
similar laws (or legal doctrines), but diverge widely in terms of how
they enforce them. This hypothesis might sound obvious, but it is in
considerable tension with a popular hypothesis that several recent
commentators have advanced. These commentators have argued that
civil law countries experience a lower rate of growth because they are
62
overregulated by bureaucrats. The key premise here is that civil law
jurisdictions are more "regulatory" than common law ones in the
sense that they require entrepreneurs to gain the prior approval of
regulators before taking significant actions.
Both hypotheses-i.e., that the civil law is more "regulatory" than
the common law and that the common law enforces more aggres-
sively-could be correct and are not necessarily inconsistent-if we
define our terms carefully. Here, an important distinction must be
drawn between "regulation" and "enforcement." Regulation works on
an "ex ante" basis, while enforcement operates "ex post." Thus, a
given jurisdiction could at the same time rank high on a "regulatory"
score in the sense that prior bureaucratic approval was generally re-
quired before private actors could take significant actions, but also low
on an "enforcement" scale in that few disciplinary actions were
brought ex post and only low aggregate penalties were levied. Con-
versely, another jurisdiction could seldom require advance approval
by regulators, but could impose highly punitive sanctions ex post for
violations of relatively clear-cut rules. Indeed, this Part will find con-
siderable evidence that civil and common law jurisdictions do appear
to divide along these lines in terms of how they supervise securities
markets, with common law regulators being less intrusive on an ex
ante basis, but imposing more frequent and, in the aggregate, far
heavier penalties ex post.
62 See, e.g., Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 29, at 1194, 1224 (suggesting that the
"heavy government intervention" that can occur in a civil law system can explain the
difference between common law and civil law countries); Mahoney, supra note 6, at
504, 511-13 (discussing the structural differences between common law and civil law
countries).
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Any serious comparative assessment of the behavior of the major
securities regulators requires that we subdivide our topic into three
components:
(1) Regulatory structure: How much discretion and deference do
different regulators give private actors, and the markets them-
selves, to determine their own rules?
(2) Enforcement inputs: How many resources do different coun-
tries invest (both in terms of budget and staff) in securities
regulation?
(3) Enforcement outputs: How aggressively do securities regulators
enforce their rules (both in terms of actions brought and
sanctions imposed)?
The following survey is hardly exhaustive, but it is sufficient to
reach two conclusions: (1) there are systematic differences between
civil and common law jurisdictions (which have little to do with formal
legal rules), and (2) the United States is at least as different from
other countries as common lawjurisdictions are from civil law ones.
A. Regulatory Structure
Worldwide, securities markets are regulated by a variety of bodies,
operating on a hierarchy of levels: (1) the markets themselves engage
in a substantial degree of self-regulation, typically adopting rules to
govern listings and trading; (2) industry-wide self-regulatory bodies,
such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in the
United States or the Investment Dealers Association of Canada, have
developed, at least in theory, as private bodies, adopting rules on a
consensual basis and requiring compliance with them as a condition
of eligibility for professionals to trade in these markets;63 (3) special-
ized securities regulators, such as the SEC in the United States or the
Autorit6 des Marches Financiers (AMF) in France, exercise govern-
mental authority and also oversee subordinate, self-regulatory bodies;
and (4) the central government, typically through the Ministry of Fi-
nance or a similar cabinet-level agency, retains authority over major
policy issues. The allocation of regulatory authority among these dif-
63 For good descriptions (and criticisms) of the role of self-regulation in the U.S.
capital markets, see generally Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-Based Se-
curities Regutation, 83 VA. L. REV. 1509 (1997); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regula-
tor, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997); Sam Scott Miller, Setf-Regulation of the Securities Markets:
A Critical Examination, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853 (1985).
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ferent bodies differs widely, but characteristically different patterns
prevail in civil and common lawjurisdictions.
The key contrast here is that in civil law jurisdictions the role of
the central government is greater and more intrusive, with far less dis-
cretion being accorded to private or self-regulatory bodies. The most
thorough recent survey concludes that, around the world, there are
three basic models of securities regulation: (1) a "Government-Led
Model" under which the central government retains significant au-
thority over securities market regulation (typified by France, Ger-
many, and Japan); (2) a "Flexibility Model," which grants greater au-
thority to the market participants to determine basic policies, but
relies on public agencies to set general policies and maintain some
level of enforcement capacity (exemplified by the United Kingdom,
Hong Kong, and Australia); and (3) a "Cooperation Model," which
assigns a broad range of powers to market participants with respect to
most aspects of policymaking, but also creates parallel and overlap-
ping public oversight bodies with strong enforcement authority (the
64United States and Canada are the leading examples of this model).
Although it can be doubted whether the second and third of these
models are truly distinguishable, the more important point is that all
the civil law jurisdictions with major securities markets clearly fall into
the first category-the Government-Led Model-while none of the
common law jurisdictions do.'5
In the Government-Led Model, the jurisdiction's laws "tend to re-
quire greater involvement of central governments in certain key ac-
tions and regulatory measures" and "restrain market institutions'
regulatory role." 6  The central government protects its influence by
structuring the securities regulatory framework "so as to maintain im-
portant channels of influence in the operation of market institu-
tions."' By way of illustration, many of the rules of the Japanese secu-
rities regulator "require the Prime Minister's approval before entering
into force," and in France, all the rules of the AMF "require the ap-
64 Howell E. Jackson & Stavros Gkantinis, Markets as Regulators: A Survey 21-22
(John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Faculty Discussion Paper No. 579, 2007),
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/papers/pdf/Jackson-
Gkantinis-579.pdf.
65 Thus, France, Germany, and Japan are the paradigms of the Government-Led
Model, while no common lawjurisdiction falls into this category. See id. at 25.
66 Id. at 22, 23.
67 Id. at 26.
68 Id. at 26-27.
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proval of the Ministry of Finance." 69 Although there may be a special-
ized securities regulator under this model, the central government
still exercises direct supervisory authority over the regulator, typically
by appointing representatives to its board. 70 To the extent that pri-
vate-market institutions have any regulatory role, it "consists largely in
supplementing agency regulatory actions," rather than in developing
new initiatives.
All of these characteristics are consistent with the basic LLS&V
story: civil law jurisdictions tend to resist private self-regulation, or as-
sign it only a secondary role, such as determining listing rules and
prospectus content requirements. But there is a corollary to the cen-
tral government's retention of direct supervision that may be more
surprising. Jackson and Gkantinis report that the jurisdictions com-
plying with the Government-Led Model were characterized by "the
lowest levels of enforcement intensity" in their study.72 In effect, the
more the central government retains the authority to approve all deci-
sions, the less it invests in enforcement and the fewer and lighter the
sanctions it imposes.
In contrast, under the Flexibility Model, the dominant philosophy
is "to grant as much leeway as possible to market participants in struc-
,,73 "turing their activities,, but "more intensive enforcement efforts are a
necessary corollary of the greater flexibility they allow to market par-
ticipants. 74 Translated into the language of LLS&V, this survey comes
into focus as a confirmation that civil lawjurisdictions do tend to insist
on direct supervision of market institutions (indeed, to the point of
micromanaging them), while common law jurisdictions defer to self-
regulation, but rely on ex post enforcement as a safeguard.
These generalizations gloss over the significant differences among
common lawjurisdictions (particularly between the United States and
the United Kingdom), but they do frame a basic hypothesis: en-
forcement intensity seems inversely related to the intrusiveness of the
government's ex ante involvement in the market. The closer the cen-
tral government supervises ex ante, the less it relies on sanctions and
penalties ex post.
(A Id. at 27.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 26.
72 Id. at 27.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 33.
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B. Enforcement Inputs
Enforcement intensity is difficult to measure. One could focus on
"input" measures-such as comparative budget and staff size data
from securities regulators around the world. But such input data may
be misleading for any of several reasons, including the possibility that
the regulator might be "captured" by the industry and thus impose
few or only minor penalties. Alternatively, a focus only on the en-
forcement actions brought and penalties imposed may omit much
relevant detail, particularly if the regulator prefers to regulate through
ex ante guidance and consultation and uses sanctions only as a last re-
sort. In any event, because little comparative data exist with regard to
penalty levels, it is necessary to begin with input data.
The first serious, if still preliminary, effort to measure the intensity
of the regulatory efforts made by the major industrialized nations with
regard to securities regulation appears to be a 2005 paper by Harvard
Law School Professor HowellJackson." Basically, Jackson found that
the common law countries.., report markedly higher levels of regula-
tory intensity on all dimensions [that] I have been able to study....
[T]hese indicia on regulatory intensity in financial areas suggest that it is
the common law countries that carry the bigger stick and swing it with
76
greater frequency and force.
A methodological problem in comparing regulatory intensity
across nations is that many financial regulatory agencies have com-
prehensive jurisdictions that extend over all, or at least most, of the
three basic sectors of the financial services industry: banking, securi-
ties, and insurance." This can confound any effort to examine how
the agencies supervise and enforce securities markets in particular.
Fortunately, the United Kingdom's FSA has compiled data on
comparative regulatory costs for ten major jurisdictions and allocates
75 Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary
Evidence and Potential Implications (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Faculty
Discussion Paper No. 521, 2005), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
olincenter/papers/pdf/Jackson_521 .pdf.
76 Id. at 3.
77 This is true, for example, in the United Kingdom, where the FSA supervises all
three sectors; in Germany, where the BaFin (an abbreviation for "Bundesanstalt fur
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht," or "Federal Financial Supervisory Authority") does the
same; and in Japan, where the Japan Financial Services Agency directly supervises the
banking and insurance industries and monitors the securities markets in cooperation
with the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Committee. Jackson & Gkantinis, supra
note 64, at 46, 45, 42.
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these costs among these three sectors in its annual report.78 Using
these data, Jackson adjusted for the relative size of the securities mar-
ket to obtain securities regulation costs per billion dollars of stock
market capitalization. 79 On that basis, he determined that the ad-
justed regulatory costs for the United States ($83,943 per billion dol-
lars of stock market capitalization) fell well below those of Australia
($279,587), Canada ($220,515), and the United Kingdom ($138,159),
and were "roughly comparable" to those of Hong Kong ($73,317) and
Singapore ($95,406)-all common law origin countries.80 But the ad-
justed costs for each of these countries dwarfed those of France
($19,041), Germany ($8896), and Sweden ($33,573). 8' Jackson pre-
pared the following chart summarizing his data:
2
Figure 1: Securities Regulation Costs per
Billion Dollars of Stock Market Capitalization
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The modest ranking given to the United States on this chart is largely
the result of the enormous size of the U.S. securities market, which,
estimated byJackson at $17 trillion, was more than seven times that of
78 Jackson, supra note 75, at 17.
79 Id. at 19 fig.3.
80 Id. at 19-20.
81 Id. at 20.
82 Id. at 19 fig.3 (relying on data from FSA, ANNUAL REPORT: 2003/04 app. 5, at
100-01 (2004), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/arO3O4/arO3O4.pdf).
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the next largest market, the United Kingdom's, estimated at $2.4 tril-
lion. 3
This pattern was not limited to securities regulation. Using a dif-
ferent database, Jackson estimated the overall financial regulatory
costs for eighteen civil law jurisdictions and ten common law jurisdic-
tions. Presented in terms of relative gross domestic product (GDP),
the results again show the common law countries vastly outspending
civil law countries.
4
Figure 2: Regulatory Costs in Civil Law
Compared to Common Law Countries
(per billion dollars of GDP)
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Only South Korea-the striped bar on the left side of the above
chart-approaches the GDP-adjusted expenditures of the common
law countries. Although it has a civil law origin, South Korea was
heavily influenced by the United States, particularly with regard to its
securities laws. The same pattern persisted when Jackson compared
regulatory staff sizes; once again, the common law countries employed
staffs that dwarfed those of the civil law countries. 85
Differences in direct governmental regulatory expenditures be-
tween common law and civil law jurisdictions have predictable impli-
cations for the firms subject to these differing levels of oversight. In
all likelihood, greater public expenditures on financial regulation in
83 Id. at 20.
84 Id. at 23 fig.7 (relying on data from FSA, supra note 82, app. 5, at 100-01). The
United States is at the far right of this chart.
85 Id. at 24 figs.8 & 9.
[Vol. 156: 229
LA WAND THE MARKET
turn imply greater private expenditures, as firms in common law
countries must expend more in order to comply with the closer and
more exacting oversight that larger and better-funded regulatory staffs
can exercise. Thus, a firm considering whether to cross-list into the
U.S. market, particularly if it is incorporated in a civil lawjurisdiction,
must anticipate increased scrutiny and, as a result, increased compli-
ance expenses.
C. Enforcement Outputs
Input data have their limitations. Conceivably, a well-funded en-
forcement agency might be "captured" by its regulatory subjects so
that it imposes few or only trivial penalties. Nor can input data inform
us about the regulatory style of an agency. Some agencies might opt
for a "soft" relationship with the regulated entities, with the public
regulator giving guidance or advice much more frequently than it im-
poses penalties. This might particularly be the case, for example, if
the securities regulator were seeking to maximize foreign cross-listings
on its principal exchange. Alternatively, another regulator might view
a detected violation as an opportunity to generate sufficient general
deterrence to prevent future violations. The conventional wisdom
views the FSA as exemplifying the first style (in part to maximize for-
eign listings) and the SEC as the exemplar of the latter, deterrent-type
approach.
Nonetheless, Jackson's data suggest that the same basic pattern
governs at the output level: common law jurisdictions appear to be
much more active enforcers than civil law jurisdictions. Enforcement
can be measured either in terms of the number of actions brought or
the aggregate financial sanctions levied. More comparative data are,
however, available with respect to the number of enforcement actions.
Comparing U.S. public securities actions with enforcement actions
brought by the FSA in the United Kingdom and the BaFin in Ger-
many, Jackson derived the following chart showing the average annual
number of actions over the 2000-2002 period:
86
86 Id. at 28 fig.10.
2007]
262 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYL VANIA LA W REVIEW
Figure 3: Average Annual Number of
Public Securities Enforcement Actions, 2000-2002:
United States Compared to United Kingdom and Germany
Q
Q
Even when these numbers are adjusted to reflect relative market size,
the disparity between the United States and Germany remains roughly
five to one.
Turning from the number of actions brought to the aggregate
monetary sanctions imposed, Jackson was only able to secure compa-
rable data for the United States and the United Kingdom. Over the
2000-2002 period, public securities enforcement monetary sanctions
imposed in the United States exceeded those imposed in the United
Kingdom, even after adjusting for relative market size, by a more than
ten-to-one margin.
87
87 Id. at 29 fig.ll.
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Figure 4: Average Annual Public Securities Enforcement
Monetary Sanctions, 2000-2002:
United States Compared to United Kingdom
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
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As will be seen shortly, this disparity has persisted. But before
continuing this comparison, it is useful to shift from a global survey of
enforcement activity to a more focused examination of a specific area
of enforcement activity: insider trading.
D. A Special Case: Insider Trading
Attempts to compare regulatory agencies in terms of the intensity
of their enforcement activities are subject to an obvious problem: one
may be comparing apples to oranges. In part, this is because securi-
ties regulators have very different jurisdictions and may have different
priorities in terms of what they wish to prosecute. For example, the
SEC supervises only the securities markets, while the FSA and BaFin
oversee all financial markets and thus have broad jurisdiction over in-
surance and banking as well. If one assumes hypothetically that insur-
ance and banking are more law-compliant industries than securities,8
the FSA or BaFin might understandably devote less of its overall re-
sources to enforcement than an agency such as the SEC, which has re-
8 This is at least a plausible premise because banks and insurance companies are
much larger in size than securities brokers and tend to have larger in-house compli-
ance staffs as a result. Also, in their dealings with retail customers, banks may engage
in transactions that are less risky than the activities of securities brokers.
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sponsibility only for securities markets. The possibility also cannot be
ignored that, for cultural or other reasons, the rate of legal noncom-
pliance (i.e., law-breaking) might be higher in one country than in
another. Lastly, priorities may differ, as one regulator may focus on
broker fraud and ignore corporate accounting irregularities, while
another may do the reverse.
Thus, to control for these problems, it is useful to focus on a spe-
cific form of illegal behavior that is contrary to law in virtually all
countries, and yet appears to occur systematically. Insider trading sat-
isfies both of these conditions. It has been criminalized by virtually all
89jurisdictions with securities markets. Yet, it persists. Thus, it supplies
an ideal context in which to examine relative enforcement intensity.
Although few countries regularly report data on insider trading prose-
cutions, the United States and the United Kingdom do-and the con-
trast is striking.
Insider trading is common in both the United States and the
United Kingdom. 9° The SEC's unequivocal response has been to pur-
sue such cases zealously. Between 2001 and the fall of 2006, the SEC
broughtjust over 300 insider trading enforcement actions against over
600 individuals and entities,9' averaging about 50 insider trading ac-
tions per year. All told, insider trading prosecutions have amounted
89 For an overview, see generally Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 22, at 77 (find-
ing that of the 103 countries with stock markets, 87 had insider trading laws).
90 Testifying before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on September 26,
2006, Mr. Christopher Thomas, the founder of Measuredmarkets, an economic con-
sulting firm, presented data suggesting that more than 40% of the mergers with a value
of $1 billion or more that were announced in the United States over the twelve-month
period ending in earlyJuly 2006 were preceded by suspicious trading that appeared to
be, in his words, "deviant trading behavior." Illegal Insider Trading: How Widespread Is
the Problem and Is There Adequate Criminal Enforcement?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 12 (2006) [hereinafter Illegal Insider Trading] (statement of
Christopher K. Thomas, President, Measuredmarkets, Inc.). He also cited a recent
study done in the United Kingdom that found almost 30% of the takeover announce-
ments in 2004 to have been preceded by "suspicious share price movements." Id.
These two studies do not indicate the relative frequency of insider trading between the
two countries because they do not use a common methodology, but they do show the
problem to be common in both countries.
Illegal Insider Trading, supra note 90, at 4 (statement of Linda Thomsen, Direc-
tor, Division of Enforcement, SEC). Ms. Thomsen's testimony indicated the following
numbers of enforcement actions involving insider trading over the period from 2001
to late 2006: 44 actions filed against 77 defendants in fiscal 2006 (through September
22, 2006); 49 actions against 93 defendants in fiscal 2005; 42 actions against 95 defen-
dants in fiscal 2004; 50 actions against 104 defendants in fiscal 2003; 59 actions against
144 defendants in fiscal 2002; and 57 actions against 115 defendants in fiscal 2001. Id.
at 137-38 n.2.
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to between 7% and 12% of the enforcement actions filed annually by
the SEC. 2
In addition to the SEC's civil enforcement efforts, the U.S. De-
partment of Justice criminally prosecutes insider trading-again, with
steady enthusiasm. The following table lists only the Federal Bureau
of Investigation's statistics on insider trading cases in which it has par-
ticipated:
93
Table 1: Annual U.S. Department of Justice
Insider Trading Prosecutions
Pending
Fiscal Year Cases Indictments Convictions
2006 56 24 15
2005 67 19 19
2004 53 21 13
2003 51 14 15
2002 52 16 12
2001 53 16 14
From this multiyear perspective, insider trading prosecutions appear
to be a regular, ongoing activity for the Department ofJustice, without
any notable peaks or valleys.
In sharp contrast, criminal prosecutions of insider trading are
conspicuous by their absence in the United Kingdom. Even civil ac-
tions are rare. The Times of London reported this year that since
2001, the FSA "has successfully brought just eight cases" alleging in-
sider trading. 94 Earlier, a 2006 in-house study conducted by the FSA's
own staff economists reported a "statistically significant increase in the
measure of informed trading between 2000 and 2004" and noted that
92 Id. at 137. This figure indicates that insider trading does not receive a dispro-
portionate priority from the SEC.
93 Illegal Insider Trading, supra note 90, at 124 tbl.1 (statement of RonaldJ. Tenpas,
Associate Deputy Att'y Gen., Department ofJustice). In addition, some insider trading
cases are initiated by the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, which claimed credit for some
23 indictments and 8 convictions between 2001 and 2006 (4 of which convictions were
obtained jointly with the FBI). Id. at 124-25 & tbl.2.
94 Grant Ringshaw, Hot on the Frail of the Insider Dealers, SUNDAY TIMES (London),
May 13, 2007, Business 8. BaFin conducted many more insider trading investigations
than the FSA, and these regularly resulted in some criminal prosecutions and convic-
tions. See infra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
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one explanation for this rise was that "no major enforcement action
had taken place in the period under examination." 9-' Even when in-
sider trading prosecutions are brought in the United Kingdom, the
penalties imposed are modest by U.S. standards, generally averaging
under $50,000. 9" The highest penalty imposed to date for insider
trading appears to have been £750,000. 97 By comparison, after his
2007 conviction on insider trading charges in U.S. federal court, Jo-
seph Nacchio, the former chief executive of Qwest, was sentenced to
six years in prison, fined $19 million, and ordered to forfeit another
$52 million (for a total penalty of $71 million). 9
The FSA would clearly like to curtail insider trading. It has in-
vested in improved market surveillance computer systems and has is-
sued guidance to issuers advising them on how to protect material
nonpublic information.99 Characteristically, however, what it has not
done is to aggressively enforce the law by bringing actions and impos-
ing penalties. Whether this reflects a disinclination to enforce aggres-
sively or simply a lack of enforcement capacity is debatable, but, as
discussed later, it has not assembled the permanent enforcement
team that such prosecutions seem to require.
E. Private Enforcement
The full magnitude of the enforcement disparity between the
United States and the rest of the world only comes adequately into fo-
cus when we add to the foregoing data the further dimension of pri-
vate enforcement. Class actions remain rare to unknown in Europe
95 Monteiro et al., supra note 22, at 4 (discussing Ben Dubow & Nuno Monteiro,
Measuring Market Cleanliness (FSA, Occasional Paper Series, Paper No. 23, 2006), avail
able at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/op23.pdf). Both the 2006 study and a
later 2007 study were conducted by members of the "Economics of Financial Regula-
tion Department." Dubow & Monteiro, supra, at 2; Monteiro et al., supra note 22, at 2.
The revised 2007 study concludes that the U.K market may "have become cleaner"
since the FSA's creation. Monteiro et al., supra note 22, at 5.
96 In 2004, the Financial Times reported that the FSA fined a securities analyst
£18,000 and a finance director £15,000. Kate Burgess, PSA Hands Out £33,000 Fines for
Insider Trading, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 17, 2004, at 22. The FSA announced that
these penalties showed that misuse of confidential information "will not be tolerated
by the FSA." Id.
97 See Ringshaw, supra note 94, at 8.
98 Carrie Johnson, Former Qwest Chief Gets 6- Year Prison Term, WASH. POST, July 28,
2007, at DI.
99 The FSA has spent over £15 million, "its largest-ever technology investment," on
.a state-of-the-art surveillance system." Ringshaw, supra note 94, at 8. But criminal
prosecutions for insider trading remain unknown in the United Kingdom.
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(including the United Kingdom);"' contingent fees are not permit-
ted; and a "loser pays" fee-shifting rule further discourages aggregate
litigation in any form.0 1 As a result, the entrepreneurial system of pri-
vate law enforcement that characterizes the United States is simply not
present in Europe. How much of a difference does this make? The
following table, based on Jackson's data, shows that private enforce-
ment in the United States imposes greater financial penalties than
public enforcement. 102
Table 2: Public Compared to Private Enforcement
in the United States: Average Payments, 2000-2002
Public Monetary Sanctions I Private Monetary Sanctions
SEC Monetary Sanctions: Class Action Settlements:
$801,333,333 $1,906,333,333
State Monetary Sanctions: Class Action Trial Awards:
$931,212,489 $17,626,000
NASD Disciplinary Sanctions: NASD Arbitration Awards:
$126,110,622 $104,000,000
NYSE Disciplinary Sanctions: NYSE Arbitration Awards:
$5,752,833 (not available)
Total: Total:
$1,864,409,277 $2,027,959,333
Once private enforcement is added to public enforcement, the
United States becomes an extraordinary outlier-for better or worse.
Moreover, as discussed later, there has been a hyperbolic increase in
100 Europe is beginning to consider the adoption of the class action, but has not
yet done so. For a survey, see Christopher Hodges, Europeanisation of Civil Justice:
Trends and Issues, 26 CIV. JUST. Q. 96, 120-23 (2007).
101 Contingent fees are now permitted to a very limited degree in Great Britain in
personal injury cases. Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of
Champions or a Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 627 & n.10 (1995). In
the United States, 95% of personal injury litigation appears to be conducted on a con-
tingent-fee basis. Id. at 626 n.3. For the fullest critique of contingent fees in the class
action context, see Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet
Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REv. 29 (1989). For a more balanced de-
scription, see Patricia Munch Danzon, Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation, 14
BELLJ. ECON. 213 (1983).
102 Jackson, supra note 75, at 27 tbl.3. NASD is the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers, the predecessor to FINRA.
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private enforcement in the United States, which overshadows even the
significant increase in public enforcement.
F. The Special Case of the United States
General agreement exists that "the level of public resources de-
voted to financial regulation is higher in common law than in civil law
countries."'' 0 3 But one cannot stop there. On closer inspection, the
more powerful relationship proves to be between the size of the en-
forcement budget and the robustness of the securities market. In-
deed, Professors Jackson and Roe have developed a series of enforce-
ment variables that have superior explanatory power to legal origins in
explaining stock market capitalization. After controlling for these en-
forcement variables, they found that common law origins no longer
had any significant relationship to stock market capitalization. 
04
The special case of the United States illustrates particularly well
that a preoccupation with legal origins causes one to miss the forest
for the trees. Viewed in terms of input data (i.e., staffing levels or
budgets, as in Jackson and Roe's case), the United States is not a no-
table outlier. After adjusting for its greater market capitalization and
GDP, one finds that other countries spend more and staff more heavily.
When, however, one turns to outputs-that is, to enforcement ac-
tivity, whether measured by number of enforcement actions or total
monetary sanctions imposed-then the United States does become a
dramatic outlier, occupying a truly polar position. To show this, it is
useful to update some of the data in Jackson's 2005 study to cover
more recent years. Initially, our focus is simply on public enforce-
ment activity, comparing only the FSA and the SEC. Set forth below is
a chart of the enforcement cases opened by the FSA and the SEC over
the years 2002 to 2006:'05
103 Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public Enforcement of Securities Laws:
Preliminary Evidence 23 (Aug. 8, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000086.
104 Id. at 24-25. In fact, they found that "not only does the common law dummy
[variable] lose significance, but the sign of its coefficient changes to negative." Id.
105 The period of reference for SEC data is its fiscal year from October 1 to Sep-
tember 30. By contrast, FSA data are based on its fiscal year, which extends from April
I to March 31. In each set of columns, therefore, FSA data are six months more recent
than corresponding SEC data. For the last column (Year 2006), only SEC data are
available. The next-to-last set of columns, however (Year 2005), includes FSA cases up
to and including March 31, 2006.
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Figure 5: Number of Annual Enforcement Cases:
SEC Compared to FSA
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The data on the decline of SEC enforcement actions are summarized in Sarah
Johnson, SEC Enforcement Declines 8.9 Percent, CFO.COM, Nov. 3, 2006, http://
www.cfo.com/article.cfm/8127167. The data are also available in the SEC's Perform-
ance and Accountability Reports, all available on the agency's website. The SEC fig-
ures total all of the civil and administrative proceedings (excluding mere investiga-
tions) initiated during the calendar year indicated along the x-axis. In 2006, 218 civil
actions and 356 administrative proceedings were brought; in 2005, the two compo-
nents amounted to, respectively, 335 and 294; in 2004, the numbers were 375 and 264,
respectively; in 2003, 271 and 365, respectively; in 2002, 270 and 280, respectively. See
SEC, 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 8 (2006) [hereinafter SEC,
2006 REPORT], available at http://sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2006.pdf; SEC, 2005
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 7 (2005) [hereinafter SEC, 2005 RE-
PORT], available at http://sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2005.pdf; SEC, 2004 PERFORM-
ANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 25 (2005), available at http://sec.gov/about/
secpar/secpar04.pdf; SEC, ANNUAL REPORT 2003, at 17 tbl. (2003), available at http://
sec.gov/pdf/annrep03/ar3full.pdf; SEC, ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 2 tbl. (2002),
available at http://sec.gov/pdf/annrep02/ar02full.pdf.
The sources for the FSA data are the FSA's annual reports, all available on its web-
site. See FSA, ANNUAL REPORT: 2005/06 app. 9, at 141 tbl. [hereinafter FSA, 2005-
2006 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://wwv.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar05-06/
ar05_06.pdf; FSA, ANNUAL REPORT: 2004/05 app. 9, at 140 tbl., available at
http://www.fsa.gov.tik/pubs/annual/arO4_O5/arO4_O5.pdf; FSA, supra note 82, app. 9,
at 140 tbl.; FSA, ANNUAL REPORT: 2002/03 app. 9, at 213 tbl., available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/arO2_O3/arO2_O3.pdf. FSA numbers refer to all
cases opened during the period April 1-March 31 of the respective year (as opposed to
cases already open or closed during that time). Categories of cases include pensions
and endowments, investment management, unauthorized activities, systems and con-
trols, noncompliance with ombudsman, market protection, listing rule breaches,
money laundering controls and financial fraud, and fitness and propriety issues or
threshold conditions (by far the most numerous category in the last three years).
Finally, for the purpose of this chart, the terms "initiated" and "opened," when
describing proceedings, are assumed to have equivalent meanings.
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Although the SEC brought more actions in each year than the
FSA, the difference might be explained, at least partially, by the larger
market capitalization in the United States. The problems with this
explanation are twofold: (1) the FSA's numbers for enforcement ac-
tions cover all aspects of the financial services industry (i.e., banking,
pensions, and insurance), not simply securities regulation; and (2) ac-
tions brought by the U.S. self-regulators (e.g., the NYSE and the
NASD) and by the various states are not included in the above chart,
even though they have traditionally brought more enforcement ac-
tions than the SEC (although generally in less serious cases). Further,
it is not clear that all "enforcement actions" are equivalent units; the
SEC typically pursues multiple individuals in each enforcement action. 106
Thus, the best measure of the disparity between the SEC and the
FSA is more likely a comparison of the aggregate annual financial
penalties imposed by each. The next chart sets forth the aggregate
financial penalties imposed by the FSA and SEC for the years 2003 to
2006.107
106 As a note of historical interest, we should point out that in previous years, FSA
numbers were substantially higher (666 cases in 1999-2000; 763 in 2000-2001). See
FSA, ANNUAL REPORT: 2000/01, at 39, available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
annual/ar00_01.pdf; FSA, ANNUAL REPORT: 1999/2000, at 37, available at http://
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar1999_00.pdf. The sharp decline appears to be ex-
plained, at least in part, by the fact that in 2001, the FSA introduced several changes in
its enforcement practices in response to consultation. In particular, in order to cut
costly tribunal hearings, the FSA implemented a pilot mediation program, which
helped reduce litigation numbers in the following years. The aim was to free resources
in view of the coming into force of the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000, a
statute that is usually viewed as prescribing more rigorous and selective discipline of
the enforcement process. See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c.8 (Eng.);
FSA, DECISION MAKING MANUAL app. (2001), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
policy/psreg annexj.pdf.
107 The FSA data are from the 2005-2006 FSA annual report. See FSA, 2005-2006
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 105, app. 9, at 142 fig. Penalties imposed in the various
areas of FSA activities, see supra note 105, were added up to obtain yearly totals. These
numbers were then converted from pounds to dollars at the rate in force on March 31,
2006 (£1 = $1.73980), the date on which the report closed. Historical currency ex-
change rates are available at OANDA.com, FXHistory-Historical Currency Exchange
Rates, http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory (last visited Dec. 1, 2007). The SEC
data are from the SEC's 2006 annual report. See SEC, 2006 REPORT, supra note 105, at
54 exhibit 2.20.
In the case of the SEC, the amounts reflect the penalties actually collected, except
in the case of 2003-2004 where the figure represents the amount ordered. Even
greater amounts were ordered in the other years, but have not yet been collected. Col-
lection has been increasingly, but never completely, successful over the years: the rate
was 40% in 2003, 86% in 2004 and 96% in 2005. The reported percentage of collec-
tion for 2006 declined to 82%. Id.
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Figure 6: Financial Penalties Collected Annually:
SEC Compared to FSA
(in millions of dollars)
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006
0 FSA 0 SEC
These statistics are conservatively biased, because the SEC also re-
covers disgorgement for investors in addition to penalties; in 2006, the
SEC reports that the total of penalties plus disgorgement came to $3.3
billion. 1 8 Next, these data are adjusted to reflect the difference in
market capitalization between the United States and the United King-
dom: °9
In the case of the FSA, the amounts were "concentrated" in a relatively low num-
ber of individual penalties (22 in 2003-2004, 31 in 2004-2005, and 17 in 2005-2006).
For an explanation of the different definitions of "year" in the respective annual
reports, see supra note 105.
108 See SEC, 2006 REPORT, supra note 105, at 8. This $3.3 billion was "ordered" in
2006, but may never be fully recovered.
1c9 Market capitalization data are available from the World Federation of Ex-
changes. See World Fed'n of Exchs., Domestic Market Capitalization, http://
www.world-exchanges.org/publications/Ts2%2OMarket%20cap..pdf (last visited Dec.
1, 2007). The London Stock Exchange capitalization (in billions) amounted to $2460
in 2003, $2865 in 2004, and $3058 in 2005. Id. For the purposes of this chart we con-
sidered U.S. market capitalization to be the sum of AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE capi-
talizations for each year. Thus calculated, U.S. market capitalization (in billions)
amounted to $14,266 in 2003; $16,324 in 2004; and $17,438 in 2005. Id. Data for 2006
were not available at the time of this writing.
It should be noted that there is not a perfect correspondence between the dura-
tion of the year in which the penalties were imposed (e.g., April 1, 2003 to March 31,
2004) and the duration of the year during which market capitalization was assessed
(e.g., January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003). It seems unlikely that this has any sig-
nificant effect.
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Figure 7: Financial Penalties Collected Annually
(in U.S. dollars per billion dollars market capitalization)
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These adjustments, however, understate the disparity between the
FSA and the SEC, because the FSA's numbers cover the entire finan-
cial services industry, not simply the securities industry. In addition,
the SEC's numbers do not include penalties levied by self-regulators
(such as the NASD and NYSE) or by the states (whose penalties can
exceed those of the SEC)."O Even on this adjusted and incomplete
basis, however, it is apparent that the SEC imposed financial penalties
that exceeded those of the FSA by a nearly ten-to-one margin (at least
in 2004 and 2005). Thus, even if their inputs are comparable (and, as
described above, staffing and budgetary levels for the FSA and SEC do
seem roughly similar after adjusting for the relative size of their mar-
kets), their outputs are markedly different. By style and tempera-
ment, the United States punishes more severely.
This same pattern is at least as evident when one turns from the
United Kingdom to Canada. Canada's system of securities negotiation
closely resembles that of the United States, except for the fact that
Canada is unique in lacking a national securities regulator. However,
if one aggregates the expenditures of all the provincial regulators in
Canada, and then adjusts for relative market size, staff size, and budg-
ets devoted to securities regulation, the two countries appear roughly
comparable." ' But all similarities end when we turn from inputs to
110 In fact, from 2000 to 2002, the aggregate penalties imposed by the states ex-
ceeded the SEC's penalties according toJackson's study. See supra Table 2.
IH Howell E. Jackson, Regulatory Intensity in the Regulation of Capital Markets: A Pre-
liminay Comparison of Canadian and U.S. Approaches, in THE TASK FORCE To MODERNIZE
SECURITIES LEGISLATION IN CANADA, CANADA STEPS UP: RESEARCH STUDIES:
STRENGTHENING MARKET CREDIBILITY AND INTEGRITY 75, 98 (2006), available at http://
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outputs. Howell Jackson found that over the period from 2002 to
2004, " [t] he SEC alone imposed 384 times as many sanctions as Cana-
dian provincial authorities... , and total sanctions from U.S. govern-
mental agencies were 718 times as large as provincial sanctions.""
2
Although public enforcement in the United States (as measured
by SEC sanctions) has become increasingly punitive over recent years,
this shift is overshadowed by even greater increases in the amounts
collected by private enforcement in the United States. Set forth below
is a chart showing the aggregate values of securities class action set-
tlements over this period."
3
Figure 8: Annual Securities Class Action Settlement Amounts
(in billions of dollars)
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Although the Cendant settlement in 2000 and the WorldCom set-
tlement in 2005 produce some discontinuity in the figures, a relatively
www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V6(2)%20Jackson.pdf. Before making these adjustments, Jackson
found U.S. budgets to be "in the range of 9 times larger than Canadian budgets,
whereas staffing levels are in the range of 5 to 6 times larger." Id. at 94.
112 Id. at 116.
113 This chart is taken from BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 1, at 75 exhibit 19.
~) ...
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steady increase is evident in the aggregate amounts paid in securities
class action settlements. Although the number of class actions fell
sharply in 2006, the message that may be better remembered by for-
eign issuers is that seven out of the ten largest securities class action
settlements in history occurred in 2005 and 2006.114 Nothing remotely
comparable occurred in Europe or Asia, where the class action and
the contingent fee remain virtually unknown.
Aggregating private and public civil enforcement, we find that, in
2005, the total monetary sanctions imposed in the United States by
the SEC and class action plaintiffs came to either $5.3 billion or $11.5
billion (depending on whether one excludes the WorldCom class ac-
tion settlement). 5 Even the lower $5.3 billion number is more than
double the 2003 figure (when class action settlements came to $2.1
billion and SEC penalties to $350 million, for a total of $2.45 billion).
G. Criminal Enforcement
Finally, the prospect of criminal enforcement radically distin-
guishes securities enforcement in the United States from that of the
rest of the world. To illustrate the interplay of SEC enforcement, De-
partment ofJustice criminal prosecution, and private class actions, it is
useful to begin with the admittedly extreme case of WorldCom. The
SEC imposed a fine of $2.25 billion on WorldCom (which was later
reduced by the bankruptcy court to $750 million)." 6 In addition, it
"barred four WorldCom executives from serving as officers or direc-
tors of publicly held companies" and suspended others "from appear-
ing or practicing before the [SEC] as accountants."" 7 The Depart-
ment of Justice fined WorldCom another $27 million and criminally
prosecuted its CEO (Bernard Ebbers), its CFO (Scott Sullivan), and
four others, ultimately resulting in "combined sentences of 32.4 years
in jail and $49.2 million in restitution.""8 A parallel private class ac-
114 Todd Foster et al., NERA Econ. Consulting, Recent Trends in Shareholder Class
Action Litigation: Filings Plummet, Settlements Soar 1, 5 (2007), http://www.nera.com/
image/BRORecentTrendsSEC1288_FINAL_0307.pdf.
115 SEC penalties in 2005 were $1.8 billion and class action settlements were either
$3.5 billion or $9.7 billion (depending on the treatment of the WorldCom settlement).
See supra Figures 6 and 8.
116 This summary is taken from Jonathan M. Karpoffet al., The Legal Penalties for
Financial Misrepresentation 1 (May 1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=933333.
117 Id.
118 Id.
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tion settled in 2005 for over $6.2 billion, which was mainly paid by
banks and financial institutions that worked with WorldCom."9
WorldCom is, of course, an extreme case, but penalties equal to or
exceeding $100 million have been imposed by the SEC in other re-
cent cases as well.'20 Moreover, WorldCom is representative of the
tendency for public and private penalties to be imposed on a cumula-
tive and overlapping basis. Karpoff et al. have computed the public
and private penalties imposed for "financial misrepresentation" 2 1-a
narrow category that essentially involves corporate financial fraud, and
not insider trading, broker-dealer misconduct, or other frequently
prosecuted securities violations. Thus, this is the bull's eye of the tar-
get if we are interested in the deterrent threat facing issuers and their
agents for misstating their financial results. Between 1978 and 2004,
the authors identified some 697 enforcement actions brought by the
SEC and the Department of Justice.122 In about half (323) of these
cases, the SEC enforcement action was accompanied by a private class
action. 2 3 These 697 enforcement actions produced a total of 4469
sanctions against individuals and 719 against firms. 124 Some 987 ad-
ministrative sanctions-i.e., cease and desist orders, censures, and
suspensions from practice-were imposed, and courts entered some
2262 permanent injunctions against individuals and some 321 against
firms.15 Five hundred seventy-four executives "were barred from serv-
ing as officers and directors of public corporations," and 415 were
barred from work as financial professionals.126 In 52.8% of these en-
forcement actions, the SEC or the Department of Justice imposed
monetary penalties on individuals (but much less frequently on the
firm itself, which happened in only 69 cases).1 7 The median penalty
for individuals was $280,000. 128
119 The exact settlement amount was $6,133,000,000 plus interest. See In reWorld-
Com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
120 Karpoff et al. point to such recent examples as Qwest Communications ($250
million), Bristol-Myers Squibb ($100 million), and Royal Dutch/Shell ($100 million).
Karpoff et al., supra note 116, at 2.
121 Id. at 1.
122 Id. at 4.
123 Id. at 8.
124 Id. at 8-9.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 9.
127 Id. at 10.
128 Id.
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Finally, some 755 individuals and 40 firms were indicted; 543 of
the individuals pleaded or were found guilty while only 10 were ac-
quitted.' 29 A total of 1230.7 years of incarceration and 397.5 years of
probation were imposed (with the average sentence being 4.2
years) . More recently, the pace has increased. Since the Depart-
ment of Justice's Corporate Fraud Task Force was formed in 2002 in
the wake of Enron, it has charged over 1300 defendants and obtained
over 1000 guilty pleas and convictions. 3 1 In short, financial fraud by
issuers, their agents, and their employees is both heavily punished in
the United States and punished by multiple and overlapping enforc-
ers, and the anecdotal evidence suggests that the level of punishment
has recently increased exponentially. 
132
H. Enforcement Styles
Regulators behave very differently, even accounting for disparities
in the budgetary resources available to them. Some regulators may
advise, request, and even admonish, but are slow to punish. Others
may believe that punitive fines generate a desirable general deterrent
effect, and that the greater danger lies in using overly mild penalties
that can be easily absorbed as a cost of doing business. In this regard,
the FSA and the SEC appear to be located at opposite ends of the con-
tinuum. Indeed, both agencies publicly proclaim as much. In 2006,
the FSA's then-chairman said that his agency was "emphatically not an
enforcement-led regulator."'1 3  In contrast, it is a virtual truism to por-
129 Id. at 9. The figure for acquittals is current as of December 31, 2005. At that
time, some 232 individuals were awaiting trial. Id.
130 Id.
131 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: Corporate Fraud Task Force
(Aug. 9, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2O06/August/06_odag_
521.html.
132 For recent evidence and analysis of the sharply higher sentences being imposed
on white collar offenders, see Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees
Cry Foul. Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
53, 55 (2007); J. Scott Dutcher, Comment, From the Boardroom to the Cellblock- The Justifi-
cations for Harsher Punishment of White-Collar and Corporate Crime, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1295,
1302-03 (2005); Jamie L. Gustafson, Note, Cracking Down on White-Collar Crime: An
Analysis of the Recent Trend of Severe Sentences for Corporate Officers, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REv.
685, 700 (2007).
133 SeeJohn Tiner, Chief Executive, FSA, Keynote Address at the Enforcement Law
Conference (June 16, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/
Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/0616 4 t.shtml). The FSA has recently come
under some criticism in the United Kingdom for its failure to combat financial crime
effectively. See, e.g., Alistair MacDonald, Judging a UK. Watchdog, WALL ST. J., July 23,
[Vol. 156:229
LA WAND THE MARKET
tray the SEC as primarily an enforcement agency. 3 Yet ironically, the
FSA has considerably more formal authority over the London Stock
Exchange than the SEC has over U.S. exchanges; indeed, the FSA
even possesses authority to determine the listing rules of the London
Stock Exchange, 3 5 while the SEC faces severe constraints on its ability
to amend stock exchange rules. 1 6 Although the FSA has more than
ample legal authority, it is reluctant to use it and strives to employ
other means of influence in preference to enforcement actions.1
3
1
Again, this illustrates that formal legal powers mean less than regula-
tory style and philosophy.
But how does one measure regulatory style? Probably the best
measure is to focus on the percentage of a regulator's budget that
goes to enforcement activity. Doing so highlights the very different
approaches to enforcement of the securities regulators in the United
Kingdom, the United States, Germany, and Australia. Collectively,
they show that the common law countries may diverge more than they
agree.
Set forth below is the FSA's enforcement budget as a percentage
of its total budget for the years 2004 to 2007.138
2007, at C1 (reporting on recent skepticism in the United Kingdom as to whether the
FSA truly protects investors). Thus, public statements that disparage or deemphasize
enforcement, such as Mr. Tiner's, may become less common.
134 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure
of the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 319 (1985) ("The notion that the
SEC behaves as if one of its principal duties is to police a cartel of exchanges and bro-
kers is consistent with the modern economic theory of regulation.").
135 Jackson & Gkantinis, supra note 64, at 47.
136 See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (in-
validating an SEC rule seeking to regulate shareholder voting through listing standards).
137 In July 2007, possibly in response to public criticism, the FSA issued a Market
Watch newsletter, which expressed its concerns about the high rate of suspicious trad-
ing on takeovers, and stated, characteristically, that the FSA was "committed to working
in partnership with the industry to reduce the incidence of market abuse." Market Di-
vision: Newsletter on Market Conduct and Transaction Reporting Issues, MARKET WATCH
(FSA, London, U.K.), July 2007, at 1, available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
newsletters/mw.newsletter21.pdf. Much of the newsletter focused on advice to com-
panies on how to control properly the dissemination of material, nonpublic informa-
tion. Will this have any meaningful effect? This author doubts that it will.
M3 The data are found in FSA, Business Plan 2007/08, at 39 tbl.4.3 (2007) [here-
inafter FSA, 2007-2008 Business Plan], available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/plan/
pb2007_08.pdf, and FSA, Business Plan 2006/07, at 42 tbl.4.2 (2006), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/plan/pb2006_- 07.pdf. While the figures for early years
are actual, the amount for 2006-2007 is an estimate and the amount for 2007-2008 is a
budgetary allocation. The amounts, originally stated in British pounds sterling, were
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Figure 9: FSA Enforcement Activity as a Percentage
of the FSA's Total Budget, 2004-2007
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4004
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O Expenditure for Other Ongoing Regulatory Activity
E3 Enforcement Expenditure
As this chart shows, enforcement expenditures at the FSA ranged be-
tween 12.4% and 13.2% of its total budget over this period.
In contrast, as the next chart shows, enforcement expenditures at
the SEC have ranged between 37.9% and 41.0% of its total budget.
13 9
converted at the going rate as of February 26, 2007 (El = $1.96390). See OANDA.com,
supra note 105.
139 The cost-of-enforcement data are taken from the SEC's 2005 and 2006 annual
reports. See SEC, 2006 REPORT, supra note 105, at 61 tbl.; SEC, 2005 REPORT, supra note
105, at 53 tbl. The figures are as of September 30 of each year.
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Figure 10: SEC Enforcement Activity as a Percentage
of the SEC's Total Budget, 2004-2006
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Both agencies then were stable and consistent in their behavior,
but the SEC devoted a percentage of its budget to enforcement that
was roughly three times that devoted to enforcement by the FSA. If
anything, the foregoing comparison may understate the disparity. In
2007, the United Kingdom's National Audit Office, which plays a role
comparable to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in the
United States, estimated that only 8% "of the FSA's total budget goes
to the Enforcement Division."14 0 Gently chiding the FSA, the National
Audit Office concluded that "[c]ombating financial crime has tended
to receive less attention than other elements of the FSA's responsibili-
ties." 
1 41
Next, let's consider the case of the German financial regulator,
BaFin.142 Like the FSA, it has a broad jurisdiction covering banking,
securities, and insurance. 143 Over the period from 2005 to 2007, its
budgets show the following: 144
140 NAT'L AUDIT OFFICE, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY: A REVIEW UNDER
SECTION 12 OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT 2000, at 47 (2007), available
at http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/06-07/0607500.pdf.
141 Id. at 7.
142 "BaFin" is the shorthand acronym for German words that translate into "Fed-
eral Financial Supervisory Authority."
143 See supra note 77.
144 See Bundesanstalt ffir Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Haushaltsplan: 2007, at 17
(2006), available at http://www.bafin.de/haushalt/2007_hh.pdf (showing budgets for
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Table 3: Amount Spent on Enforcement by BaFin
Amount Spent
Total Budget on Enforcement
Year (C MM) (C MM) Percentage
2005 109.71 3.40 3.1%
2006 126.82 6.51 5.1%
2007 120.15 7.81 6.5%
Although BaFin's budget is considerably smaller than the FSA's,
the percentage spent on enforcement (4.9% on average) is less than
half the 12.5% spent on enforcement by the FSA. 145 Thus, one can le-
gitimately ask: is the FSA more like the SEC or more like BaFin? De-
spite their different legal origins, the FSA and BaFin seem to share a
common aversion to enforcement.
But the full story is more complex. BaFin does investigate and re-
fer insider trading cases, which are then prosecuted by German
criminal prosecutors. In 2005, BaFin opened 54 new insider trading
investigations, filed complaints against 95 persons, and referred 23
cases to prosecutors. 146 While the prosecutors had mixed success, 9• 147
convictions were obtained for insider trading. In 2006, 51 investiga-
tions were started and 11 convictions were obtained for insider trad-
ing.148 Even if most insider trading referrals could not be successfully
prosecuted, those convictions that did result still dwarf the British ex-
perience, where criminal prosecutions are unknown and civil cases are
few. 149
In fairness, enforcement in Germany does not typically take the
form of litigation. Rather, BaFin relies more on auditing, conducting
2005, 2006, and 2007); Bundesanstalt ffir Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Haushaltsplan:
2007 (Enforcement) 8 (2006), available at http://www.bafin.de/haushalt/2007-hh
enforce.pdf (showing expenditures on enforcement for 2005 and 2006, and estimated
expenditures for 2007).
145 See supra Figure 9.
46 See BUNDESANSTALT FOR FINANZDIENSTLEISTUNGSAUFSICHT, 2005 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 159 [hereinafter BAFIN, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://
www.bafin.de/jahresbericht/2005/kapitel-VI-en.pdf.
147 Id. at 160.
148 BUNDESANSTALT FOR FINANZDIENSTLEISTUNGSAUFSICHT JAHRESBERICHT 2006,
at 166 tbls.22 & 23 (2006), available at http://www.bafin.de/jahresbericht/2006/
kapitelVII.pdf.
149 See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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its own audits of an issuer's financial statements on both "spot check"
and extraordinary bases, with BaFin "seeking] to perform around 120
spot checks every year. ' ' l
In this light, the SEC, with its very different emphasis on litigation,
deterrence, and high penalties, appears to stand apart, employing a
very different approach to enforcement than either the FSA or BaFin.
Still, it does not stand alone. At least one securities regulator does
appear to rival and perhaps outdo the SEC at enforcement: Australia.
Although Australia has substantive corporate and securities laws
closely resembling those of the United Kingdom, its approach to en-
forcement appears to be at least as aggressive as that of the United
States. Between 2003 and 2006, the percentage of the budget allo-
cated to enforcement activities of the Australian Securities and In-
vestments Commission (ASIC), Australia's securities regulator, ex-
ceeded that of the SEC.
15
1
150 See BAFIN, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 146, at 182.
151 The data on ASIC's enforcement expenditures relative to its total budget, as
illustrated in Table 4, were provided to the author by Professor Ian Ramsay of the Uni-
versity of Melbourne and are available in ASIC's annual reports. See ASIC, ASIC AN-
NUAL REPORT 2005-06, at 14 tbl., 15 tbl. [hereinafter ASIC, 2005-2006 REPORT], avail-
able at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/ASIC.Annual_
Report_2006.pdf/$file/ASICAnnualReport_2006.pdf; ASIC, ASIC ANNUAL RE-
PORT 2004-05, at 12 tbl. [hereinafter ASIC, 2004-2005 REPORT], available at
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/ASIC-AR-05.pdf/$file/
ASIC_AR_05.pdf; ASIC, ASIC ANNUAL REPORT 2003-04, at 10 tbl. [hereinafter
ASIC, 2003-2004 REPORT], available at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/
LookupByFileName/ASIC AR04complete.pdf/$file/ASICAR.04_complete.pdf. In
terms of dedicated staff, ASIC had 373 enforcement personnel out of a total staff of
1394 (or 26.8%) in 2005-2006, 420 enforcement personnel out of a total staff of 1497
(or 28.1%) in 2004-2005, and 385 out of a total staff of 1466 (or 26.3%) in 2003-2004.
ASIC, 2005-2006 REPORT, supra, at 17, 15; ASIC, 2004-2005 REPORT, supra, at 14-15;
ASIC, 2003-2004 REPORT, supra, at 12-13. In addition, some 100 additional personnel
are employed in a consumer protection office to handle complaints from the public
made against Australian public corporations. ASIC, 2005-2006 REPORT, supra, at 17
tbl. Hence, the percentage may be even higher.
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Table 4: Amount Spent on Enforcement by ASIC
Total Budget
Amount Spent
on Enforcement
Year (AUS $) (AUS $) Percentage
2003-04 $196 million $84 million 42.9%
2004-05 $208 million $97 million 46.6%
2005-06 $218 million $102 million 46.8%
This translates into an average percentage of 45.4%-almost four
times that of the United Kingdom.
The level of ASIC's enforcement effort also appears to exceed that
of both the United States and the United Kingdom, once adjustment
is made for the smaller size of the Australian market. From 2005 to
2006, ASIC commenced 195 criminal, civil, and administrative actions
against some 391 defendants, 112 and, after adjustment for relative mar-
ket capitalization, Australia leads both the United Kingdom and the
United States. 153
152 ASIC 2005-2006 REPORT, supra note 151, at 18. In the same period, ASIC re-
solved by settlement or verdict some 189 criminal, civil, and administrative proceed-
ings and reported that 94% of its total litigation was successful, with 72% of its criminal
cases and 98% of its civil cases being "successfully" resolved. Id.
153 The adjustments for relative market size were based on market capitalization
figures taken from the website of the World Federation of Exchanges. World Fed'n of
Exchs., Domestic Market Capitalization (2005), http://www.world-exchanges.org/
publications/EQUITY105.pdf. For more information on the method used to calculate
market capitalization, see note 109, supra. The data on the number of enforcement
cases brought by the SEC and FSA were taken from the agencies' annual reports. See
SEC, 2006 REPORT, supra note 105, at 8; FSA, 2005-2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
105, app. 9, at 141 tbl. Although the United States comes in last on this market-
adjusted chart, it must be remembered both that (1) the SEC's jurisdiction is limited
to securities regulation, while the other two share a broader jurisdiction, and (2) this
chart excludes the cases brought by self-regulatory organizations and the states in the
United States, which efforts may equal or exceed that at the SEC.
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Figure 11: Number of Enforcement Cases in 2005
(per billion dollars of market capitalization):
Comparison of United States, United Kingdom, and Australia
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Australia has also used criminal sanctions aggressively,154 although
more recently it has placed a greater emphasis on civil litigation.
The differences among these three agencies go even deeper than
their budget numbers reveal. In its 2007-2008 business plan, the FSA
explains that it outsources enforcement, hiring outside attorneys and
accountants because it is not economical for it to retain full-time en-
forcement personnel. 155 In contrast, the SEC and ASIC rarely out-
source enforcement matters to private law firms. In fact, for the SEC,
with an over 1200-person enforcement staff, enforcement is the core
mission. 156
To sum up, the United Kingdom outsources enforcement, while
Germany principally relies on auditing. In contrast, in the United
States and Australia, litigation is the preferred weapon; Australia, like
154 See Helen Bird et al., Strategic Regulation and ASIC Enforcement Patterns: Results of
an Empirical Study, 5 J. CORP. L. STUD. 191, 246 (2005) (finding that the ASIC made
"predominant" use of criminal penalties between 1997 and 1999). More recently, Aus-
tralia has made increasing use of civil penalties to punish selective disclosure and in-
sider trading offenses. See Michelle Welsh, Eleven Years On-An Examination of ASIC's
Use of an Expanding Civil Penalty Regime, 17 AUSTL.J. CORP. L. 175, 176 (2004).
"' See FSA, 2007-2008 Business Plan, supra note 138, at 39 ("The unpredictable
size, timing and complexity of enforcement cases means that it is not economical to
retain permanent staff to handle all cases.").
156 Arguably, a permanent and substantial enforcement staff could create an in-
centive to bring enforcement actions so as to keep the staff fully employed. Although
this author does not believe that the SEC's enforcement staff has ever been underoc-
cupied in the modern era so as to give rise to this temptation, the claim is at least plau-
sible, and some may feel it helps explain the difference in regulatory styles.
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the United States, even has some private securities litigation. Prior
comparative research on securities regulation has focused on budgets
and staff size, but the critical variable may instead be the percentage
of the regulator's budget devoted to enforcement. Once we focus on
this variable, the supposed dichotomy between "common law" and
"civil law"jurisdictions seems to break down.
III. THE BONDING HYPOTHESIS
Theories about the motives underlying cross-listing and its impact
on the cost of capital date back several decades. Generally, the early
theories stressed investment barriers and segmented markets. By
cross-listing, the corporation leaped over these barriers and obtained
access to a lower cost of capital.' 7 But as more comprehensive event
studies emerged in the late 1990s, economists were surprised by the
magnitude of the stock market reaction to cross-listing.' 5s Using a
broad sample of cross-listing announcements, a 1999 study by Darius
Miller found a positive 1.2% average abnormal return upon the an-
nouncement of a U.S. cross-listing by a foreign issuer. 15  Even more
interestingly, the stock market reaction was greater for emerging mar-
ket firms (1.5%) and for firms listing on the major U.S. exchanges
(2.6%).'w Given the general decline of investment barriers and mar-
ket segmentation during the 1990s, it seemed puzzling both that (1)
the number of firms seeking to cross-list rose exponentially in the
1990s when investment barriers were falling, and (2) the vast majority
of firms did not cross-list. In principle, the cost of capital disparity
should have declined as market barriers eroded, and thus fewer issu-
ers should have been motivated to cross-list. Paradoxically, however,
the race to cross-list intensified in the 1990s, just as market barriers
fell. Moreover, in the face of a high positive stock market reaction to
157 For reviews of these traditional theories, see Doidge et al., supra note 11, at 207-
210, and G. Andrew Karolyi, The World of Cross-Listings and Cross-Listings of the World:
Challenging Conventional Wisdom, 10 REV. FIN. 99, 101-05 (2006).
158 Two 1999 studies were especially noteworthy: Stephen R. Foerster & G. An-
drew Karolyi, The Effects of Market Segmentation and Investor Recognition on Asset Prices:
Evidence from Foreign Stocks Listing in the United States, 54 J. FIN. 981, 983 (1999), which
observed that cross-listed shares experienced unusually significant positive price
changes, and Darius Miller, The Market Reaction to International Cross-Listings: Evidence
from Depositary Receipts, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 103, 103 (1999), which found the market reac-
tion to cross-listing to be significantly more positive than had been previously observed.
l5 Miller, supra note 158, at 114 tbl.4.
1 Id.
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cross-listing in the United States, one would also expect most firms to
cross-list. In short, a simple "market barriers" story then no longer
worked well as an explanation for cross-listing. Contemporaneously,
U.S. firms were sharply reducing their own cross-listings abroad.1
6 1
This suggested that U.S. firms had discovered that widening their
shareholder base did not reduce their cost of capital.
Thus, in 1999, this author proposed a bonding explanation:
16
2
managers "bonded" themselves not to accumulate excessive private
benefits by deliberately subjecting themselves to a stricter regulatory
regime (i.e., that of the United States) under which the firm would be
(1) subject to the enforcement powers of the SEC; (2) exposed to pri-
vate enforcement through class actions; and (3) required to provide
fuller financial disclosures by reconciling its financial statements to
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). At once, this
theory could explain (1) why the stock market responded more fa-
vorably to an exchange listing than other forms of entry into the
United States (because only the cross-listing firm would become sub-
ject to the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act);
(2) why the stock price movement was greater when the issuer was
from an emerging market country (because its home country investor
protections were weaker, thus increasing the impact of cross-listing);
and (3) why many firms did not cross-list (because they wanted to con-
tinue to consume private benefits).
Empiricists quickly found additional evidence of bonding. In par-
ticular, William Reese and Michael Weisbach showed that firms cross-
listing into the United States behaved very differently than non-cross-
listing firms, with the former typically making equity offerings in both
the United States and abroad after they had cross-listed in the United
States. 163 Still, doubts persisted that these findings were robust enough
to make the bonding hypothesis stronger than other rival explana-
tions. Then, more recently, studies found a disparity reaching as high
as 30% or more between the Tobin's q of firms that cross-listed on a
161 See Pagano et al., supra note 15, at 2661, 2664 (noting that the number of
American companies cross-listed in Europe fell from 284 to 184 between 1986 and
1997 as European exchanges became less attractive).
162 Coffee, The Future as History, supra note 13, at 691-92.
163 Reese & Weisbach, supra note 13, at 91; see also Evangelos Benos & Michael S.
Weisbach, Private Benefits and Cross-Listings in the United States, 5 EMERGING MARKETS
REv. 217, 237-38 (2004) (finding that positive stock price reactions following cross-
listing announcements were indicative of bonding).
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major exchange and that of similar firms that did not cross-list.'64 This
evidence compelled a greater acceptance of the bonding hypothe-
sis. 165
Even more recently, researchers found that there has consistently
been a valuation premium associated with a U.S. listing, but none with
a listing on the London Stock Exchange.166 At this point, the inade-
quacy of the traditional explanations seems apparent, because they
cannot explain the unique premium for cross-listing on a U.S. ex-
change. An even more puzzling aspect of this disparity is that few
firms appear to be motivated by it. In theory, all large foreign firms
should be expected to cross-list in order to obtain a lower cost of capi-
tal. Yet, the evidence is that "fewer than one in 10 large public com-
panies from outside the United States choose to cross-list their shares
on U.S. markets."1 67 Only the bonding hypothesis can explain this
puzzle by responding that the costs of bonding fall disproportionately
on controlling shareholders, who therefore often find such a strategy
unattractive.
Other evidence also corroborates this explanation that controlling
shareholders may find bonding to be too costly and so forego a U.S.
cross-listing. Empirical studies have found that firms cross-listing in
the United States make better financial disclosures168 and rank higher
on indexes measuring the quality of their corporate governance.169
Even more telling is the fact that firms with controlling shareholders,
particularly controlling shareholders enjoying high private benefits of
control, are less likely to cross-list. One recent study finds that the
probability that a firm will cross-list on a U.S. exchange is inversely re-
lated to both (1) the level of the control rights held by the control
group and (2) the margin by which these control rights exceed the
164 See studies discussed supra notes 11, 15. Tobin's q is calculated as the market
value of a company divided by the replacement value of its assets. A ratio above 1
shows that management has caused the firm's market value to exceed its asset value.
Thus, a high ratio suggests a strong management that is maximizing shareholder value.
165 For this conclusion, see CLARK & WOJCIK, supra note 19, at 139.
166 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
167 Doidge et al., supra note 11, at 206.
16 See Khanna et al., supra note 19, at 499-50 (concluding that cross-listing firms
have better disclosure practices because of either listing regulations or self-selection by
firms that elect to cross-list).
l6 CLARK&WOJcIK, supra note 19, at 151-52.
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controlling shareholders' cash flow rights. 170 Because the controlling
shareholder whose control rights exceed its entitlement to dividends
probably designed the governance structure of its corporation pre-
cisely to allow it to receive private benefits, it is hardly surprising that
such a shareholder is reluctant to cross-list in a market that may re-
strict such benefits.
Similarly, many foreign issuers enter the U.S. market by means of
Rule 144A, 171 which allows them to sell their shares to sophisticated
institutional investors, but not to retail investors. This "private" entry
into the United States means that these foreign issuers need not regis-
ter under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.172 As a result, such issuers do not become subject to SEC
scrutiny and face little prospect of either public enforcement or pri-
vate class action litigation. But the listing premium associated with
such a "private" entry into the United States is much smaller than
those incident to entry onto a major exchange (and sometimes it may
even be negative).173 Why then make such a limited entry? The most
170 Craig Doidge et al., Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-Listing De-
cision 18 (Charles A. Dice Ctr. for Research in Fin. Econ., Working Paper No. 2005-2,
2005), available at http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/dice/papers/2005/2005-2.pdf.
171 See Private Resales of Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2007).
Rule 144A was principally designed to give foreign issuers access to U.S. institutional
investors without listing on an exchange or registering under the Securities Exchange
Act, as issuers already having their common stock listed on a U.S. exchange may not
use Rule 144A for a common stock offering. Id. § 144A(d) (3) (i).
172 Rule 144A offerings are not considered to be public offerings of securities, and
are thus exempted from registration by section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. See
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000) (exempting "transactions by an issuer not involving any pub-
lic offering"). So long as fewer than 300 holders resident in the United States acquire
the class of stock sold by the foreign issuer pursuant to Rule 144A, the foreign issuer
will not be required to register under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Exemp-
tions for American Depositary Receipts and Certain Foreign Securities, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12g3-2(a) (2007).
173 It has long been known that the stock price reaction was insignificant to a for-
eign firm's entry into the U.S. markets by means of a private placement under Rule
144A (as opposed to a listing on a U.S. exchange). See Coffee, Racing Towards the Top,
supra note 13, at 1784-85; Miller, supra note 158, at 114-15. More recent work by
Doidge et al. has found that the Tobin's q valuation ratio is significantly higher for for-
eign firms cross-listing onto a U.S. exchange in comparison to foreign firms listing over
the counter or making a Rule 144A offering. See Doidge et al., supra note 3, at 18-19.
Nonlisted foreign firms that enter the United States by these other means "have low
sales growth, low Tobin's q ratios, and higher insider ownership compared to U.S. ex-
change-listed firms or even compared to other listed firms." Id. at 19. Another recent
study finds that cross-listings in the over-the-counter market are associated only with
"less pronounced" reductions in the firms' cost of capital and that Rule 144A private
placements even have adverse effects. See Hail & Leuz, supra note 12, at 28, 15.
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logical explanation is that the controlling shareholders optimize their
own position by obtaining some valuation premium but little exposure
to regulatory oversight or enforcement risk.
The bonding hypothesis has its critics. One recent article focuses
on cross-listing by Israeli firms (a major subcategory of U.S. cross-
listings) and argues that there can be little bonding because Israeli
corporate law has essentially the same substantive provisions as U.S.
law. 7 4 Although this study concludes that "law does not matter" (at
175least for Israeli companies), it does recognize that Israeli courts are
"very slow" in processing corporate cases and, because of their heavy
case loads, are "unable to develop expertise or robust precedence in
matters pertaining to securities law."176 Ironically, the bottom line
reached here that "law does not matter" again makes the same mis-
take as LLS&V (for whom law matters greatly): both are focusing on
"law on the books" but ignoring the greater prospect of enforce-
ment-both public and private-in the United States.
A related objection has been that U.S. enforcement-both private
and public-seldom focuses on foreign issuers. 77 Because the deter-
rent threat incident to cross-listing is thus asserted to be illusory, it
might follow, if this premise were accurate, that the bonding premium
was based on a false premise. In truth, the data here are hard to as-
sess. Because virtually all securities class actions settle, there are fewer
reported decisions than in other comparable areas of law. Still, this
criticism is overstated. That its author could not find cases involving
foreign issuers does not mean that none exist. NERA Economic Con-
sulting, a specialist in securities litigation, publishes an annual report
that shows, among other things, the "Top Ten Shareholder Class Ac-
tion Settlements" of all time, ranked by their settlement values. Its
2006 report shows that three out of these top ten involved foreign de-
174 See Ariel Yehezkel, Foreign Corporations Listing in the United States: Does Law Mat-
ter? Testing the Israeli Phenomenon, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 351, 393 (2006) (arguing that
there is no significant difference between Israeli and U.S. securities laws because Israeli
securities laws adopt the "supervisory structure and the regulatory philosophy" under-
pinning the U.S. laws).
175 Id. at 397.
176 Id. at 392.
177 See Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S. Se-
curities Laws?, 75J. FIN. ECON. 319, 335, 342-43, 346-49 (2005) (asserting that the SEC
rarely took enforcement actions against cross-listed foreign firms between 1934 and
2002).
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fendants, and all three such cases were resolved in 2006.178 Similarly,
in 2006, the SEC brought and settled significant enforcement actions
against both TV Azteca, a major Mexican broadcasting company,179
and European former officers and directors of Spiegel, Inc. 8" In
2005, it sued nine officers of Royal Ahold, 18' and in 2006, the Depart-
ment of Justice extradited three British investment bankers to stand
trial in connection with the Enron criminal prosecution (despite an
angry national protest in Great Britain). 8 2 Thus, it may be true that
U.S. enforcers allocate disproportionately fewer resources to cases in-
volving foreign defendants, but, even if this effort is modest by U.S.
standards, it may still far exceed the limited attention that securities
fraud receives abroad.
Critics of U.S. enforcement have also sought to use the listing
premium associated with foreign cross-listings in the United States to
prove their overregulation thesis. The Paulson Report notes that the
valuation premium incident to a foreign company's cross-listing in the
United States has recently declined and argues that this decline is a
178 See Foster et al., supra note 114, at 5 tbl. Two of these three cases involved
Nortel Networks, a Canadian issuer, which settled separate securities class actions cov-
eing different time periods for $1.143 billion and $1.074 billion, respectively. The
other foreign defendant was Royal Ahold, NV, a Dutch company, which settled for $1.1
billion. These settlements rank fifth, seventh, and sixth, respectively, on the list of the
ten largest class action settlements. Id. Another major securities class action was re-
cently brought against Royal Dutch Shell, a British-Dutch corporation with ADRs listed
on NYSE, and survived at least an initial challenge to class certification. See In re Royal
Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 380 F. Supp. 2d 509, 548, 551 (D.N.J. 2005) (affirming
jurisdiction over nonresident foreign defendants and the claims of foreign class mem-
bers), amended by 404 F. Stipp. 2d 605 (D.N.J. 2005).
179 See In re TV Azteca, S.A., Exchange Act Release No. 54,445, 2006 SEC LEXIS
2041 (SEC Sept. 14, 2006) (admin. proceeding) (finding that TV Azteca failed to
comply with section 13(a) of the Exchange Act by failing to file an annual report).
Pursuant to this settlement, TV Azteca's registration under the Securities Exchange Act
was revoked, id., and certain of its senior officers were barred from serving as officers
or directors of a public company. SEC v. TV Azteca, S.A. de C.V., et al., Defendants
Agree To Settle SEC Charges, Litigation Release No. 19,833 (Sept. 14, 2006), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2006/r19833.htm.
180 SeeJudith Burns, Spiegel Ex-Officers Settle SEC Charges in Accounting Case, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 3, 2006, at B4 (reporting that the former officers and directors of Spiegel,
which had been acquired by a European corporation that allegedly caused it to con-
ceal its deteriorating financial performance, had consented to penalties ranging from
$100,000 to $170,000 each).
181 See Ron Scherer, Enron Effect: The Changed Corner Office, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONI-
TOR, Jan. 18, 2005, at 1.
181 See Kate Murphy, 3 Britons in Enron Case Are Told To Remain in U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 2006, at C3 (describing extradition of three British investment bankers who
were indicted on fraud charges in the Enron prosecution).
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consequence of Sarbanes-Oxley and U.S. overregulation. 8 3 In truth,
there has been a recent decline, but most of it occurred prior to the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002. Subsequent to the Act's passage,
the listing premium rose significantly in 2003, and has remained rela-
tively stable thereafter. The following chart shows the cross-listing
premium for the years 1997 to 2005.184
Figure 12: The U.S. Cross-Listing Premium, 1990-2005
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
0 Non-ross-listed Tobin's q 0 U.S.-exchange-listing Tobin's q premium
What caused the decline between 2000 and 2002? No one could
reasonably argue that the market in 2000 anticipated Sarbanes-Oxley.
But an epic stock bubble did burst in 2001; then Enron failed in 2001,
and WorldCom followed in 2002. More generally, a wave of financial
restatements in the United States shook investor confidence and de-
183 PAULSON REPORT, supra note 1, at 47-48.
184 Doidge et al., supra note 3, at 49 fig.2. This figure shows the average Tobin's q
of non-cross-listed firms each year, as well as the premium (in the darker tone) for
firms cross-listing on U.S. exchanges. For another examination of the cross-listing
premium over an overlapping period, see Litvak, The Cross-Listing Premium, supra note
18. Litvak finds the cross-listing premium to have declined from year-end 2001 to year-
end 2002 and interprets this as, in part, an indication that investors perceived the costs
of Sarbanes-Oxley to outweigh its benefits. Id. at 1898, 1896, 1871. Professor Litvak
does not discuss the period after 2002.
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pressed the equity market. s5 In particular, the initial public offering
(IPO) market in the United States dried up for both domestic and
foreign IPOs. This is important because studies have shown that a
principal motive for cross-listing by a foreign issuer is to conduct an
IPO. s 6 Thus, the most plausible inference is that, as of 2000 and
2001, when the average listing premium fell dramatically, both U.S.
and foreign investors postponed contemplated IPOs and therefore
had little reason to enter into this now scandal-ridden market. But
then, after 2002, as the IPO market slowly strengthened, issuers again
saw increased value in a cross-listing. Such a pattern does not prove
that Sarbanes-Oxley strengthened U.S. corporate governance, but it is
at least consistent with such an interpretation of investors' percep-
tions.
If most objections to the bonding hypothesis can be dismissed as
requiring no more than modest qualifications, one significant prob-
lem remains, which starts from a seeming paradox. Considerable evi-
dence shows that the bonding premium is greatest for companies in-
corporated in jurisdictions with the weakest investor protections. 
7
But other studies find that corporations from such countries are the
least likely to cross-list. ss Both tendencies make sense. Investors re-
ceive greater protection from cross-listing when the home jurisdic-
tion's law is the weakest, and it is precisely in those cases that the con-
trolling shareholder gives up the most (and so is the least likely to
cross-list).
Hence, who does cross-list? As Reese and Weisbach found, it is
disproportionately firms with investment projects that desire to fi-
nance them by conducting an IPO soon after cross-listing."'9 These
firms cross-list to obtain a lower cost of capital. But, if it is predomi-
nantly firms with superior investment projects that cross-list (and the
market senses this), then cross-listing by a foreign company becomes
as much a form of signaling as a form of bonding. That is, if a firm
185 For a concise discussion of the wave of financial restatements that began to ac-
celerate in 1997 and has continued through 2005, see PAULSON REPORT, supra note 1,
at 119-21. As it notes, the U.S. GAO has found that the annual frequency of restate-
ments rose seven-fold over this period, from 0.9% in 1997 to 6.8% in 2005. Id. at 120
fig.V.1.
186 See Reese & Weisbach, supra note 13, at 86 tbl.3.
187 See Hail & Leuz, supra note 12, at 7-8 (discussing studies that have reached this
conclusion).
:88 E.g., Doidge et al., supra note 170, at 18, 23.
189 SeeReese & Weisbach, supra note 13, at 101-02.
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that believes it possesses superior investment opportunities wants to
convince the market of its claim, it might cross-list in the United States
to signal to investors not that it has adopted superior protections for
minority shareholders, but that its investment projects are superior.
The market's reaction might in effect be, "You would not do anything
as dangerous as listing in the United States, unless you were very cer-
tain of your investment opportunities"-essentially, one bonds in or-
der to signal. The relative contributions of the two-bonding and
signaling-to the valuation premium seem indeterminate.
Clearly, self-selection plays a large role. Few firms cross-list simply
to obtain a valuation premium; rather they seem to have capital-
raising or acquisition plans, which cross-listing allows them to pursue
at a lower cost. The greater the risk of liability, the more the implicit
promise of "fair" treatment for minority shareholders seems credible.
Thus, the puzzle here becomes whether foreign firms cross-list in the
United States because they have better disclosure and corporate gov-
ernance ratings or whether they have these higher ratings because
they cross-list. Again, this is the issue of the direction of causality.
Clark and W6jcik shed some light on the issue, finding that foreign
firms that cross-list in the United States increase the disparity between
their higher governance ratings and the lower ratings of non-cross-
listing firms subsequent to the time that they cross-list."9 As they sug-
gest, such post-listing governance reform looks more like bonding
than simple self-selection.
Nonetheless, even if these firms do appear to be "bonding" them-
selves, they represent a relatively small proportion of the firms that are
potentially eligible to cross-list. As a result, it may be more profitable
for the value-maximizing securities exchange to focus instead on the
much larger number of firms that do not wish to bond (as London ar-
guably has done).
IV. POLITICAL ECONOMY: WHY Do CMIL LAW AND COMMON LAW
COUNTRIES DISAGREE OVER ENFORCEMENT?
Civil law jurisdictions seem to invest fewer resources in regulation
and to impose far less in financial penalties. Why? In turn, the
United States is unique in its enthusiastic use of both public and pri-
vate enforcement and criminal penalties. Again, why?
190 CLARK& WOJCIK, supra note 19, at 148-49.
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At least three different types of theories seem plausible. First, it is
arguable that dispersed ownership corporate governance systems
(which include the United States, the United Kingdom, and few, if
any, others) need greater enforcement because their agency cost
problems are more intractable. Alternatively, it can be argued that
the United States expends more on enforcement than the United
Kingdom because U.S. corporate law gives shareholders fewer control
rights than does that of the United Kingdom-in effect, enforcement
might be a substitute for weaker corporate governance.
Second, a political theory can be advanced to the effect that vari-
ous corporate constituencies-labor in particular-have agreed to ac-
quiesce to the receipt of private control benefits by controlling share-
holders in return for the controlling shareholders' tacit agreement to
subordinate shareholder wealth maximization to the interests of other
constituencies. This implicit social contract argument is similar to
theories that Mark Roe has repeatedly advanced.' 9'
Third, the political demand for enforcement may follow from the
creation of a deep, retail-oriented securities market. This is the oppo-
site of a LLS&V-style theory, because the causality is reversed: eco-
nomics determines politics. Under this view, once a nation achieves
dispersed ownership, those individual owners become a potent politi-
cal force. Following scandals, they demand reforms and retribution.
In the United States, the 1929 market crash led directly to the adop-
tion of the federal securities laws in 1933 and 1934, and the 2000-
2002 bubble and associated scandals produced Sarbanes-Oxley. Al-
though the stock market decline in 2000 was just as abrupt in Europe,
the economic loss in Europe fell more on institutional investors than
individual shareholders (because European markets are dominated by
191 See, e.g., MARKJ. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 35-37 (2003) [hereinafter ROE, POLITICAL
DETERMINANTS]; Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120
HARv. L. REv. 460, 496-98 (2006) [hereinafter Roe, Legal Origins]; MarkJ. Roe, Political
Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 602-03
(2000); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organiza-
tion, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065, 2068-70 (2001). Professor Roe's essential thesis is
that in labor-friendly political regimes (a description that characterized Europe during
much of the twentieth century), dispersed shareholders could not effectively resist la-
bor's claims on the corporation, but controlling shareholders could (at least to a
greater degree). Concentrated shareholders could strike an implicit bargain with la-
bor under which the controlling shareholders' right to private benefits of control was
recognized in return for their guarantee of high employment and wages to labor.
Such a bargain was easy for labor to accept because its cost largely fell on minority
shareholders, not labor.
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institutions). Hence, the 2000 market decline produced less of a po-
litical demand for protection and retribution in Europe.
Each of these theories is briefly reviewed below.
A. The Relative Need for Enforcement
Why would common law countries need to invest more in regula-
tion and enforcement? First, their stock markets are larger, more
valuable national assets. But the data reviewed earlier show that, even
after adjustment for relative market size, common law jurisdictions in-
vest and expend more on regulation than do civil law jurisdictions.
One explanation might be that common law and civil law jurisdictions
face characteristically different types of fraud and fiduciary abuse.
19 2
The United States and the United Kingdom are characterized by dis-
persed shareholder ownership, while civil law jurisdictions (and most
of the world) are characterized by concentrated ownership. In com-
mon law (or dispersed ownership) systems, where there typically is a
separation of ownership and control, the principal agency cost prob-
lem involves managers. In contrast, in civil law (or concentrated own-
ership) systems, minority shareholders must instead fear exploitation
by controlling shareholders.
This is not to claim that fiduciary abuse by controlling sharehold-
ers is less serious than fiduciary abuse by managers. But the former
may be more easily monitored by regulators, who therefore have less
need to engage in ex post enforcement. As noted earlier, civil law ju-
risdictions seem to adopt a more intrusive and regulatory stance to-
ward securities regulation, but place less emphasis on enforcement.
Arguably, one may substitute for the other. To illustrate, when a con-
trolling shareholder proposes a squeeze-out merger or a self-dealing
transaction, it will typically be an open and visible matter, and minor-
ity shareholders may complain to the regulator. The regulator might
then take a variety of actions (e.g., warnings, refusal to approve or to
issue other required clearances) that do not involve an enforcement
proceeding and do not levy any financial penalty, but could force the
modification or cancellation of the transaction. In this context, it is at
192 This follows from the very different characteristic structure of shareholder own-
ership in the two types ofjurisdictions. For the argument that the structure of owner-
ship determines the prevalent type of fraud, see John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corpo-
rate Scandals: Why the US.A. and Europe Differ, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 198, 198
(2005).
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least arguable that ex ante review is more efficient than ex post en-
forcement.
In contrast, actions taken by individual corporate managers may
be more secretive and even furtive (such as insider trading). In these
cases, the regulator learns of the abuse (if at all) ex post and can only
respond with an enforcement action, rather than with cautionary ad-
vice. As a result, one plausible hypothesis is that regulators in com-
mon law jurisdictions facing managerial misbehavior must rely more
heavily on enforcement actions.
Controlling shareholders are also more likely to be repeat players
than are managers; hence, they may have a greater interest in preserv-
ing their reputational capital. To be sure, both managers and control-
ling shareholders can face "final periods" in which the possibility of
enormous gains overcomes their desire to protect their reputational
capital. But these occasions seem more likely to arise in the man-
ager's career. Controlling shareholders cannot as easily bail out,
dumping their shares into the market (both because thin markets
cannot absorb controlling blocks without enormously reducing the
share price and because controlling shareholders typically sell only in
privately negotiated sales of control blocks at values above the market
price). The recent shift to equity compensation in the United States
may have exacerbated the agency costs relating to managerial conduct
because stock options are a high-octane fuel that can create perverse
incentives.
In summary, the abuses that controlling shareholders can commit
(i.e., largely self-dealing transactions) may be better addressed
through corporate law restrictions than by ex post enforcement. De-
pending on the jurisdiction, regulators may be able to simply inform a
major financial institution or the well-known family that controls a
company that the regulators will not permit it to effect a merger that
eliminates the public minority (or that they will only give permission
at a higher price). Such regulation through informal contacts could
be cheaper and involve less public confrontations that give rise to
measurable events, such as enforcement actions.
To present this interpretation is not to argue that the evidence
confirms it, but that there is at least some supporting evidence. Kate
Litvak has found that as Sarbanes-Oxley came closer to enactment,
and in particular as its application to foreign issuers became clearer,
the stock prices of non-U.S. firms cross-listed in the United States de-
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clined relative to a sample of non-cross-listed, but otherwise similar,
firms from the same jurisdictions. in Given the tendency of foreign
firms to have controlling shareholders who consumed substantial pri-
vate benefits of control, one might have predicted that minority
shareholders in such controlled firms would have benefited from Sar-
banes-Oxley's increased rigor. But apparently, the public sharehold-
ers in these firms instead perceived the enhanced enforcement as in-
volving more costs than benefits for them. This apparent distaste for
increased regulation may suggest that there could be a mismatch be-
tween U.S.-style regulation (with its heavy emphasis on independent
directors) and the agency problems of firms in concentrated owner-
ship legal regimes.
Not only might U.S. corporate governance be poorly designed for
firms in concentrated ownership legal regimes, it might also be less
rigorous and shareholder-friendly than the governance system of the
United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, the positions of the CEO
and the chairman of the board are typically separated, shareholders
vote on executive compensation, and institutional investors generally
both own a higher percentage of the stock and exercise closer over-
sight than in the United States. 194 If the United Kingdom has superior
corporate governance, it arguably might feel less need to invest in en-
forcement. In general, if shareholders can protect themselves ade-
quately, less need exists for regulators to invest heavily in enforcement
or to use stock exchange listing rules as a leverage point by which to
impose higher governance standards. This would explain both why
the London Stock Exchange, unlike the NYSE, has never felt pressure
to raise its listing standards and also why foreign firms incur no listing
premium when cross-listing on the London Stock Exchange.
B. The Social Contract Theory
Mark Roe has long sought to explain European corporate govern-
ance in terms of an ongoing political contest between the left and the
right. Social democracies press managers to stabilize employment and
to forego some profit-maximizing opportunities. Concentrated own-
ership arose, he has argued, because it could better resist the power of
193 See Litvak, The Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 18, at 213-15.
194 For an overview, see Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?:
Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1997, 2002-05
(1994).
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labor than could dispersed owners.9 5 Where labor is powerful (as it is
in Europe), democratic governments will be less likely to support a
strong system of investor protection that might contest labor's at-
tempts to gain a greater share of the corporation's cash flow.
Lurking in this analysis is an implicit social contract between labor
and controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholders grant la-
bor and related constituencies a stronger claim on the firm's cash flow
than they could negotiate in dispersed ownership systems, but in turn
ask labor to accept the controlling shareholders' diversion of the pri-
vate benefits of control to themselves. Labor, in turn, has little reason
to object because these benefits do not come out of its own pocket,
but those of the minority shareholders. Stated approvingly, this thesis
sees a social contract. Viewed skeptically, however, this thesis essen-
tially describes a coalition of the rich and the poor against the middle
class.
This hypothesis faces some problems. In a globalizing world,
where firms compete in international markets, a corporation cannot
permit both controlling shareholders and labor to raid its treasure
without suffering some competitive disadvantages. Still, neither con-
trolling shareholders nor labor should be seeking protections for mi-
nority shareholders or demanding greater public expenditures on en-
forcement. Minority shareholders might try, but they could be a
relatively weak force in countries characterized by thin equity markets.
C. The Political Consequences of Dispersed Ownership
In earlier work, this author has suggested that LLS&V have their
causality reversed. LLS&V argue that preexisting legal rules enabled
strong capital markets to develop. The countertheory is that where
dispersed ownership systems of corporate governance did develop,
their rise in turn created a political demand for investor protection.""
Once ordinary citizens entered the equity securities markets and in-
vested their life savings in stocks, they demanded legal protections
against fraud and fiduciary abuse. In short, legal rules followed,
rather than preceded, market developments.
195 See ROE, POLITIcAL DETERMINANTS, supra note 191, at 14; Roe, Legal Oigins,
supra note 191, at 497.
06 See Coffee, supra note 6, at 65-66, 80-81 (asserting that strong markets create a
demand for stronger legal rules).
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U.S. history is easily reconciled with this latter theory. Retail in-
vestors invested heavily in the stock market in the 1920s, experienced
the Crash of 1929, and demanded (and received) new legal protec-
tions in the form of the federal securities laws enacted in 1933 and
1934. Less noticed has been the fact that British history is also consis-
tent with this same story. A recent British study found that British se-
curities markets developed prior to the enactment of any strong com-
prehensive system of investor protection. 97 Indeed, these authors
doubt that Britain had a strong system of investor protection, compa-
rable to that of the United States, prior to 1980.19 Today, China
seems to be following the same trajectory. Its securities markets have
grown rapidly since 1990, but it still lacks strong laws or a well-funded
enforcement system. 99
This hypothesis that the law follows, rather than leads, economic
developments makes it easier to understand the "enforcement gap"
between common law and civil law countries. Securities markets in
Europe were historically thin and never succeeded in winning broad
retail participation. Absent extensive citizen involvement in the mar-
ket, there was no interest group to lobby for more investment in en-
forcement. In contrast, in the United States, Congress learned long
ago that the SEC is a popular agency with voters, and both parties
have generally supported it.
Phrased more generally, in a democracy, there is usually competi-
tion for public funds. Investment in enforcement rises only after the
securities market first convinces the middle class to invest in it. Thin
markets create no such political demand because the principal inves-
tors are financial institutions, which, even if defrauded, hesitate be-
fore demanding new laws, stronger regulation, and more enforcement
(which could some day be applied against them). Even the enforce-
ment disparity between the United States and the United Kingdom
can be explained on this basis: although the United Kingdom has
dispersed ownership, shareholders in the United States are more "re-
197 See Julian Franks et al., Ownership: Evolution and Regulation 37-38 (European
Corporate Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 009/2003, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=354381 ("[D]ispersed ownership developed on the basis of
informal relations of trust rather than formal systems of regulation.").
198 See id. at 15, 58 tbl.A3 (noting that the Companies Act first granted U.K. inves-
tors preemption tights in 1980).
199 For such an assessment, see Zhong Zhang, Legal Deterrence: The Foundation
of Corporate Deterrence-Evidence from China 56-57 (June 14, 2007) (background
paper, Initiative for Policy Dialogue conference) available at http://
www0.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/pub/Zhong-Zhang-Legal-Deterrence.pdf.
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tail" in character, while the United Kingdom's market is dominated by
institutions. Hence, there is a greater political demand in the United
States for strong enforcement.
Under Ockham's razor, the simpler, more parsimonious theory
should be preferred over the more complex. The explanation that
dispersed ownership produces a political demand for enforcement is
simpler than Roe's theory of a hidden political coalition between la-
bor and controlling shareholders to restrain shareholder wealth
maximization.2 0 0 Although both could be correct in part, more needs
to be shown on behalf of the Roe theory before it should be pre-
ferred.
D. An Initial Summary
Potentially, the foregoing theories are complementary. Each
could explain to some degree the observed pattern of different levels
of enforcement intensity between common law and civil law jurisdic-
tions. That the United States is an outlier is also explained by multi-
ple factors, including (1) the enormous size of its equity markets;
(2) the broad retail participation in those markets; (3) the federal
structure of the U.S. government, which results in multiple enforcers
(and invites competition among them); and (4) the U.S. public's ap-
201parent preference for retributive punishment in securities cases.
Will these differences persist? To the extent that either the effi-
ciency arguments for greater use of deterrence in dispersed owner-
ship regimes or the political "social contract" explanation are deemed
more persuasive, these differences should persist. But if dispersed
200 See sources cited supra note 191.
201 The political preference of U.S. voters for strong enforcement and exemplary
punishment is shown not just by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which vastly elevated penalty
levels, but by earlier legislation as well. In 1988, Congress elevated the penalties for
insider trading in response to popular demand in the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, which also added section 20A to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 to authorize private litigation against insider trading. Pub. L. No.
100-704, secs. 3-5, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-1, 78ff(a),
78t-1 (2000)). Congress also moved to a sentencing guideline system in 1991, in part
to increase actual penalty levels for white-collar crime. The United States Sentencing
Commission repeatedly enhanced the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines through
the 1990s. See Cindy R. Alexander et al., Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal
Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms, 42 J.L. & ECON. 393, 418 (1999) (finding
that fines and penalties imposed on public corporations had increased since the im-
plementation of the guidelines). In short, the popularity of "get tough" measures on
white-collar crime (and particularly securities fraud) shows the impact of a retail
shareholder culture on the political process.
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ownership is the driving force, the disparity in enforcement levels be-
tween the United States and Europe may decrease as retail participa-
tion in the stock market continues to grow across Europe.
V. THE POLICY TRADEOFFS
The foregoing arguments have an obvious policy implication: if
U.S. regulators were to listen to the siren call of those who favor re-
duced regulation (and less deterrence), they might unintentionally
both increase the cost of capital in the United States and reduce the
bonding premium that attracts current cross-listing firms. Ironically,
this could result in reducing the incentive for ambitious firms with
high-quality governance to list in the United States, while decreasing
the barrier to firms with controlling shareholders intent on enjoying
the private benefits of control. A more counterproductive policy
would be hard to imagine.
But one cannot simply stop at this point. The next question must
be faced: Should the United States further increase its unique em-
phasis on enforcement? Or has it already hit the point of diminishing
returns such that some relaxation would not increase its cost of capi-
tal? If the latter is true, a relaxation might arguably attract some list-
ings by firms that today face significant costs in conforming their gov-
ernance to U.S. standards. Kate Litvak's data show that foreign firms
cross-listed in the United States declined in value as Sarbanes-Oxley's
approaching application to foreign issuers became clear.' °2 If these
already cross-listed firms constituted a representative sample of firms
that were, on average, seeking to bond themselves, then their share-
holders logically should have seen Sarbanes-Oxley as a serendipitous
benefit because it increased the degree to which these companies
were subject to strong financial controls. Why then did their stock
prices respond negatively to its passage? Conversely, other data show
that the U.S. listing premium began to rise again the year after Sar-
203banes-Oxley. How can these opposing trends be reconciled?
A. Should the United States Relax Enforcement?
The premise of the recent debate has been that foreign firms are
fleeing the United States because of overregulation. That premise
202 Litvak, The Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 18, at 195.
203 See Doidge et al., supra note 3, at 49 fig.2.
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appears to be highly questionable, but it was also always true that only
a limited number of foreign firms were ever attracted to the U.S. mar-
kets. This suggests in turn that relaxing U.S. enforcement efforts,
which never viewed the foreign issuer as a priority enforcement target
to begin with, would have a modest (and possibly counterproductive)
impact.
How can we reconcile the inconsistent evidence that (1) the stock
prices of cross-listed foreign firms went down as Sarbanes-Oxley ad-
vanced through Congress (at least in comparison to similar non-cross-
listed firms), and (2) the listing premium has increased since 2003?
The simplest explanation is that investors in cross-listed foreign firms
did indeed perceive Sarbanes-Oxley to involve more costs than bene-
fits for them. Grafting "independent" audit committees onto the two-
tier Continental board seemed cumbersome and might have had little
beneficial impact where a controlling shareholder would still elect the
board.2 4
The subsequent apparent increase in the listing premium is a
more speculative matter. If we assume that cross-listing firms come to
the United States to raise equity or make acquisitions, however, it is
relevant that 2000, the year in which the premium began to fall, was
also the year that the "high-tech" bubble burst and the IPO market es-
sentially dried up in the United States (for both domestic and foreign
firms).2°5 This implies that a primary purpose underlying the decision
of foreign firms to cross-list was no longer attainable, at least in the
short run. It is no surprise then that these firms' premium over non-
204 At the time, the implications of section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley were not under-
stood because its statutory language is not demanding. It was not until the PCAOB's
adoption of Auditing Standard No. 2 a year later that its high costs came into view. See
supra notes 24, 25, and accompanying text.
205 According to Thomson Financial, U.S. IPOs declined after 2000, reaching bot-
tom in 2003. They have more recently risen, but not back to their pre-2000 level:
Year Number Value
2000 387 $61 billion
2001 99 $38 billion
2002 95 $28 billion
2003 84 $16 billion
2004 252 $48 billion
2005 213 $39 billion
2006 182 $40 billion
2007 225 $42 billion
Back of the Envelope, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2006, at C5. The data for 2006 were as of De-
cember 2006; the data for 2007 were projections.
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cross-listed firms decreased. But by the same token, as the IPO market
reawakened in subsequent years, that premium began to increase
modestly again. This analysis at least furnishes a testable prediction,
under which a rise in IPOs should produce an increased listing pre-
mium.
If the U.S. IPO market is awakening, one would expect some in-
creased migration of foreign firms to the United States. This does not
mean that the NYSE or NASDAQ will outcompete the London mar-
kets for cross-listings (as the vast majority of foreign firms have no ex-
pectation of being able to utilize the U.S. IPO market), but it does
suggest that the recent unattractiveness of the U.S. market to foreign
firms may be a temporary phenomenon; 2003 was the nadir from
which there already has been an upturn.
B. Public Enforcement Versus Private Enforcement
Even if general relaxation of enforcement makes little sense, more
selective relaxation may. Although LLS&V hypothesized that private
enforcement outperformed public enforcement in encouraging the
206growth of securities markets, the latest evidence shows the reverse,
that "public enforcement typically dominates private enforcement.,
20 7
Moreover, even if private enforcement is thought to generate desir-
able general deterrence, some aspects of our current system of private
enforcement are particularly likely to discourage the foreign issuer
from entering the U.S. market. Today, if the foreign issuer stays off-
shore and does not cross-list, it is unlikely to become subject to a secu-
rities class action, because class actions are not generally recognized
outside the United States and U.S. courts would be unlikely to certify a
wholly extraterritorial class of foreign investors who did not purchase
on the U.S. market. But if the foreign issuer does cross-list in the
United States, it now faces the prospect that, even though it lists few
shares in the United States, a global class action might be certifiedi1208
covering investors around the world. Indeed, in the recent Royal
2W See La Porta et al., supra note 31, at 20 ("Public enforcement plays a modest
role at best in the development of stock markets.").
207 Jackson & Roe, supra note 103, at 37.
M See, e.g., In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 437 F. Supp. 2d 467, 469
(D. Md. 2006) (approving a class action settlement where the vast majority of the class
members were non-U.S. residents); In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 380 F.
Supp. 2d 509, 548 (D.N.J. 2005) (denying the defendants' motion to dismiss the claims
of foreign investors), amended 6y 404 F. Supp. 2d 605 (D.N.J. 2005).
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Ahold class action, the $1.1 billion settlement was paid by a foreign
corporation incorporated in the Netherlands, even though an esti-
mated 80% of the class resided outside the United States. 2 09 Any ra-
tional foreign issuer is likely to regard this disparity between a small
issuance of shares in the United States and a potentially much larger
global liability to all investors worldwide-because of the worldwide
reach of U.S. class action law-as forbidding. Such an issuer may
know that its stock price is volatile and that a sudden stock price drop
could trigger a U.S. securities class action. Although U.S. courts will
not certify a class including foreign investors simply because some
shares are listed in the United States and will require that some con-
duct occur in the United States,210 this requirement has been easily
satisfied in a number of cases, either because the cross-listed firm had
some U.S. operations or because its management communicated with
securities analysts in the United States.
The obvious remedy here is not to bar all securities litigation
aimed at foreign firms, but to restrict the plaintiff class to U.S. nation-
als and foreign residents. Allowing foreign nonresident investors who
did not purchase in the U.S. market to be included within the class
209 The Royal Ahold litigation, which is the largest securities settlement to date in-
volving a European corporation, see supra note 178, is the subject of multiple reported
decisions. For the decision preliminarily certifying the settlement, see In re Royal
Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., No. 03-MD-01539, 2006 WL 132080, at *4 (D. Md. Jan.
9, 2006); for the decision approving the settlement, see 437 F. Supp. 2d at 469. The
defendants estimated that 80% of the class consisted of foreign investors. Memoran-
dum of Law in Support of Lead Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Certification of
Settlement Class and Final Approval of Settlement and Plan of Allocation of Settle-
ment Proceeds at 12, In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 437 F. Supp. 2d 467
(D. Md. 2006) (No. 03-MD-01539).
210 This "conduct test" was initially formulated by Second Circuit Judge Henry
Friendly. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986-87 (2d Cir. 1975)
(holding that for the Securities Exchange Act to apply to transnational frauds, conduct
occurring in the United States needs to be more than "merely preparatory" to the
fraud); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.
1972) (noting that the Securities Exchange Act does not apply "[w]hen no fraud has
been practiced in this country and the purchase or sale has not been made here"). Its
premise is that Congress would not have "intended to allow the United States to be
used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when
[they] are peddled only to foreigners." IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d
Cir. 1975). Absent significant conduct by the defendant in the United States that ex-
tends beyond "merely preparatory" efforts, the class action is likely to be dismissed.
See, e.g., In re Nat'l Aust. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03-6537, 2006 WL 3844465, at *5-7
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006) (dismissing such a proposed class action where "a significant,
if not predominant, amount of the material conduct.., occurred a half-world away"),
amended by 2006 WL 3844463 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2006).
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not only forces U.S. courts to serve as "policemen to the world," but
also dissuades foreign issuers from cross-listing. As important as it
may be to a foreign issuer to reduce its cost of capital, it is not worth
risking potential liability in the billions.
More generally, the securities class action seems poorly designed
as a shareholder remedy for the familiar secondary market "stock
drop" case, because it essentially involves shareholders suing share-
holders. Inevitably, the settlement cost imposed on the defendant
corporation in a securities class action falls principally on its share-
holders. This means that the plaintiff class recovers from the other
shareholders, with the result that secondary market securities litiga-
tion largely generates pocket-shifting wealth transfers among largely
diversified shareholders."' To illustrate, imagine that a hypothetical
pension fund owns a portfolio of companies of which, over a period of
time, 100 become defendants in securities class actions. In 50 of these
cases, the pension fund is in the plaintiff class and shares in the recov-
ery; in the other 50, it is not in the plaintiff class and thus bears some
of the recovery. The payments would thus balance out, except for the
fact that the recovery received in the 50 cases in which the pension
fund is a plaintiff is diminished by the legal fees of the plaintiffs' at-
torneys (probably 25% or so on average), the fees of the defense at-
torneys, and other related costs (including increased liability insur-
ance premiums). As a result, from a compensatory perspective, the
odds are high that shareholders are made systematically worse off by
securities class actions.
Redesign of the "secondary market" securities class action is possi-
ble,2 2 but almost certainly not imminent. In the interim, it must be
recognized that private enforcement of the securities laws in the
United States is working imperfectly, achieving little, if any, compen-
sation and only limited deterrence because its costs fall largely on in-
nocent shareholders rather than the culpable corporate officers actu-
ally responsible for "cooking the books" and other misdeeds.
Thus, if in the United States private enforcement under the fed-
eral securities laws seldom imposes penalties on the culpable, it makes
sense to place greater reliance on public enforcement. This is a pre-
211 For a fuller statement of this critique (and supporting evidence), see John C.
Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementa-
tion, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1556-61 (2006).
212 For specific proposals, see id. at 1572-84.
2 Because of a variety of factors, corporate officers almost never contribute funds
from their own pockets to settle securities class actions. Id. at 1550-51.
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scription quite at odds with LLS&V, who favor private enforcement
(but do not understand it), and traditionalists who still rely, like a
crutch, on the Supreme Court's statement in J. Case Co. v. Borak
2 1 4
that private enforcement is "necessary" for the effective enforcement
of the securities laws. At present, we have both too little private en-
forcement and too much-too little in that the outside professionals
are rarely sued and corporate officers often pay nothing, and too
much in that the corporation itself is regularly sued and settles at the
shareholders' expense. If private enforcement is to work, it will have
to be refashioned and directed at the corporation's officers and gate-
keepers, and this would require legislative action 15
C. Reconsidering Public Enforcement
The number of enforcement cases brought by the SEC fell signifi-
cantly in 2006, as did the total amount of the financial penalties that it
216exacted. It is not entirely clear what is behind this reduction in en-
forcement intensity, but one factor would appear to be a new SEC pol-
icy, announced in January 2006, under which the Commission will not
impose significant financial penalties on corporate issuers unless "the
issuer's violation has provided an improper benefit to the sharehold-
ers. " 2 17 This policy is now being followed, for example, in the con-
temporary stock option backdating investigation, as the Commission
has slowed settlements until it determines what, if any, "improper
benefit" was provided to the corporation through the backdating of stock
options.218
The SEC's premise here is that large penalties imposed on the
corporation fall on innocent shareholders and so should be used only
214 See 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) ("Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides
a necessary supplement to Commission action.").
215 Most importantly, it would be necessary to overturn Central Bank of Denver, N.A.
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994), which exempts those
who "aid and abet" a securities law violation from civil liability under Rule lOb-5.
216 The number of enforcement actions fell from 629 in 2005 to 574 in 2006, and
the total penalties collected fell from roughly $1.8 billion to $991 million. See supra
Figures 5 and 6.
217 Press Release, SEC, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2006-4.htm.
21 See Brooke Masters & Jeremy Grant, SEC Near to a Formula for Options Fines, FIN.
TIMES (London), Feb. 7, 2007, at 24 (reporting the SEC's movement toward creating a
formula for punishing companies that takes into account the financial benefit the
company received from backdating).
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when the corporation (and its shareholders) have received an im-
proper benefit from the violation. Indeed, much evidence shows that
most forms of corporate misconduct primarily benefit the corporate
executives.2 9  Analyzing a large sample of class actions, Arlen and
Carney report that managerial self-interest seems to be the dominant
motivation underlying securities fraud, with managers frequently en-
gaging in behavior resembling insider trading.22 ° If so, the obvious
policy prescription is to move from a system of enterprise liability
(under which penalties are principally imposed on the corporation
and, ultimately, its shareholders) to a system of agent and managerial
liability. Such a shift may be in progress today, but it has gone largely
unnoticed. In truth, the SEC is better positioned to shift its target in
this fashion than is the plaintiffs bar because it alone has authority to
221
sue and sanction aiders and abetters.
How would a shift from an enforcement policy of enterprise liabil-
ity to one of agent or managerial liability affect the "competitiveness"
of U.S. markets? Assuming that the latter policy could be pursued
with the same level of enforcement intensity, it should not affect the
cost of capital, but it might reduce the fear of investors in foreign
firms that cross-listing could subject them to Draconian penalties. To
be sure, the managers of these firms might want indemnification or
insurance, or might demand a risk premium in their compensation,
but the SEC has long resisted indemnification of securities law liabili-
ties, and the prospect of excess compensation to managers seems far
less likely in concentrated ownership regimes. Today, when either the
SEC or private plaintiffs impose punitive penalties on a public corpo-
ration because its managers have overstated earnings (or otherwise
"cooked the books"), a system of enterprise liability is at work that re-
sembles punishing the victim of a burglary because the victim negli-
gently suffered a burglary. Such punishment may deter, but among
those likely deterred are foreign firms considering cross-listing in the
United States.
29 For a fuller version of this argument, see Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney,
Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV.
691, 727-30.
22 Id. at 726, 731.
221 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000) (author-
izing the SEC, but not private plaintiffs, to sue any person who "knowingly provides
substantial assistance to another person" in connection with a securities law violation).
[Vol. 156: 229
LA WAND THE MARKET
D. Cross-Border Securities Regulation
Currently, the SEC is considering whether to permit foreign bro-
kers to access U.S. investors through websites and other means and so-
licit them to buy the securities of foreign issuers that do not comply
222with U.S. disclosure requirements. Under a trial balloon floated by
the SEC, foreign brokers who misbehave would instead be disciplined
by foreign regulatory authorities under an approach that SEC officials
have termed "substituted compliance." 23 But would foreign regula-
tors behave in a fashion even remotely resembling that of the SEC?
The foregoing survey of enforcement efforts obviously raises questions
about whether foreign compliance systems would impose anything re-
sembling U.S.-style enforcement discipline. Certainly, foreign regula-
tors do not appear to be doing so at present.
Moreover, if this proposal were to be adopted, the significance of
listing on a U.S. exchange might decline, as foreign issuers could di-
rectly access U.S. investors. Logically, this should reduce the incentive
for foreign issuers to cross-list on U.S. exchanges if they can access
U.S. capital by other means. In response, some have suggested that
the SEC should also permit U.S. exchanges to list foreign issuers that
224do not comply with U.S. disclosure or governance standards. But if
this were done, the ability of foreign issuers to "bond" by opting into
higher disclosure and governance standards might be impaired. Even
with unfettered access through foreign brokers to foreign stocks that
did not comply with U.S. disclosure standards, U.S. investors could
still understand that an NYSE or NASDAQ listing carried with it some
assurance of higher disclosure or superior governance. Arguably, the
brand name should not be diluted. Nor can it be argued that an effi-
cient market solves this problem, as the listing of foreign securities
2 Floyd Norris, Should U.S. Markets Be Wide Open?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at Cl.
223 See Ethiopis Tafara & RobertJ. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S.
Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARv. INT'L L.J. 31, 32 (2007) (proposing a
framework that permits exemption from SEC registration based on compliance with
foreign securities regulations and laws substantively similar to the SEC's).
See Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders: Time To Tear Down the Barriers to Global
Investing, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 85, 95-96 (2007). Others preceded Greene in making
this suggestion. See, e.g., Franklin R. Edwards, Listing of Foreign Securities on U.S. Ex-
changes, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1993, at 28, 32-36 (suggesting that a loosening of
SEC reporting requirements for foreign issuers would carry little danger); Merritt B.
Fox, The Political Economy of Statutoiy Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market
for Securities, 97 MICFI. L. REv. 696, 731 (1998) (explaining the superiority of a disclo-
sure regime that is determined by the nationality of the issuer rather than investor
residency or transaction location).
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that do not comply with U.S. standards subjects at least undiversified
retail investors to a risk from which accurate share pricing does not
225protect them.
More generally, the ability of the SEC to rely on "substituted" for-
eign enforcement logically requires as a prerequisite better informa-
tion and some assurances about the level of enforcement that the for-
eign regulator will supply. In any foreign jurisdiction, it is not the first
priority of the typically underfunded local regulator to protect U.S.
investors who, for example, purchased securities from foreign brokers
in international transactions. Even if the foreign regulator gave the
same level of attention to complaints from U.S. investors as it did to
those of its own citizens, the enforcement resources allocated and the
sanctions levied might fall well below what the SEC would have done.
More work remains to be done here before the SEC's trial balloon is
226ready for adoption.
CONCLUSION
This Article began by asking whether the U.S. capital markets are
losing their competitiveness. The answer may depend on what we
mean by "competitiveness." At least two definitions are possible: (1)
the ability to attract foreign listings and offerings, and (2) the ability
to minimize the cost of capital. Although these goals are not contra-
dictory, they can frequently be in tension, because relaxed regulation
may facilitate the former while retarding the latter. Different con-
stituencies also benefit, with market professionals gaining when offer-
ings and listings are attracted, while the public (including noninves-
tors) benefits from a reduced cost of capital.
225 That the market may be efficient and that share prices may be accurate does
not protect retail investors from the misappropriation of private benefits of control by
controlling shareholders. Market efficiency might mean that the market has accu-
rately priced the expected level of benefits that the average controlling shareholder
will divert to itself and discounted the stock's price for this mean value. But this mean
value will be surrounded by considerable variance, as all controlling shareholders are
not alike. If all investors were fully diversified, this variance would not hurt them, be-
cause excessive misappropriation in one case would be balanced by subnormal misap-
propriation in another. But not all retail investors are diversified, and many will be
predictably injured by such variance. Thus, the stock price can be accurate, but retail
investors can still suffer injury.
226 One alternative might be to require that the foreign broker subject itself to pri-
vate litigation in the United States by consenting to service of process and posting a
bond. Private enforcement here might be a more effective "substitute" for U.S. public
enforcement than foreign public enforcement is.
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Against this backdrop, enforcement intensity may advance the lat-
ter goal, while potentially chilling the former. Clearly, the United
States pursues securities law violations through both public and pri-
vate enforcement with an intensity unmatched elsewhere in the world.
This intensity probably contributes to the United States' lower cost of
equity capital, but may also explain the unwillingness of many foreign
firms to enter the U.S. market. Possibly, this pattern of higher en-
forcement intensity in the United States may extend beyond securities
and financial regulation and characterize other fields as well,2 7 but
this Article will not attempt to cover that broader waterfront. Nor has
this Article contended that the United States' enforcement policy is
always wise or just or that the United States has found the optimal
level of enforcement intensity. Rather, the principal point has been
that the United States occupies a polar position on the enforcement
continuum and this affects the character of its capital markets.
But what explains the unique level of enforcement intensity in the
United States? Here, the differences between common law and civil
law jurisdictions, while they exist, do not provide much explanatory
power, because once one focuses on enforcement outputs, the United
Kingdom appears in some respects to more closely resemble Germany
than the United States. The better hypothesis appears to be that en-
forcement intensity varies with the level of retail ownership in the ju-
risdiction. If so, this is an example of reverse causality, with develop-
ments in the market shaping the evolution of law, not the reverse.
That said, there is much that we do not yet understand. Probably
the most striking contrast among securities regulators is the difference
between their inputs and their outputs. U.S. regulators are roughly
comparable to those of other common law countries in their budget
and staffing levels, but not in the number of enforcement actions
brought or the magnitude of the sanctions imposed. Here, they
largely inhabit a world of their own. This raises at least the possibility
that, outside the United States, more is done through ex ante regula-
tion than through ex post enforcement. Although the SEC also uses
ex ante regulation,2  it seems more committed than other regulators
227 Political scientists have, for example, noticed sharp contrasts in the "regulatory
style" of environmental regulation between the United States and Japan. See ROBERT
A. KAGAN, ADvERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAw 194-95 (2001) (charac-
terizing U.S. enforcement as harsher and more adversarial, and describing the pitfalls
of this style).
22 The SEC certainly uses ex ante controls, such as no-action letters, advance re-
view and approval of registration statements, and prior clearance of certain transac-
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to a policy of general deterrence through substantial penalties. Other
nations may also prefer informal negotiations and dispute resolution.
Whether non-U.S. regulators can achieve functionally similar results
through such "lighter" forms of regulation remains uncertain. Ar-
guably, the FSA's evident preference for gentle guidance over tough
enforcement may work adequately with law-compliant public corpora-
tions and investment banks, but such an approach seems futile in the
case of more predatory misbehavior, such as insider trading, and it is
the latter that may most affect the cost of capital.
Conversely, the possibility that the United States overdeters also
cannot be dismissed. In particular, the United States also outdistances
the rest of the world in its commitment to private enforcement. But
private enforcement seems to have had little, if any, impact on clearly
criminal behavior such as insider trading. In this light, the social util-
ity of public and private enforcement should not be equated. In the-
ory, both can deter, but in practice, private enforcement visits most of
its penalties on the shareholders who are to be protected, while the
culpable largely escape sanctions. Because of the circularity of the se-
curities class action, with diversified shareholders essentially suing di-
versified shareholders, the more we rely on private enforcement, the
more we encourage pocket-shifting wealth transfers, with each such
229transfer among shareholders being heavily taxed by the legal system.
These disparities between the United States and the rest of the
world in the intensity of both public and private enforcement may
suggest that the United States has a problem-or, alternatively, that
the rest of the world does. This Article will not attempt to pass final
judgment. It has not been this Article's claim that the United States
employs the optimal level of enforcement. Rather, its real claim is
that enforcement intensity affects the cost of capital. If this hypothesis
is accepted, then it has dramatic implications for securities regulators:
their mission should not be simply to protect investors, but to reduce
the cost of capital and thereby enhance gross domestic product. The
literature on securities regulation has long underplayed this public-
regarding role, but noninvestors as well as investors depend on the ef-
ficiency of securities regulation, as the costs of underenforcement fall
on the economy as a whole.
tions, in effect to regulate entry into its capital markets. But these controls are not
employed by the Division of Enforcement, which is committed to ex post enforcement.
29 See Coffee, supra note 211, at 1556-61.
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To state this hypothesis is not to claim that it has been fully
proven. Much about enforcement styles is still not understood. What
is clear, however, is that integration of securities regulation on a cross-
border basis requires greater agreement about the expectations of all
of the participants regarding enforcement. Today, they are not even
speaking the same regulatory language.
Within the United States, this hypothesis that enforcement policy
can affect the cost of capital also suggests that a basic conflict may ex-
ist between the interests of the public and those of the professionals
and intermediaries active in the securities markets. For the profes-
sionals, relaxing enforcement may imply more transactions, more list-
ings, and a higher volume of business. Possibly, this explains the
FSA's relative distaste for enforcement. Yet, although attracting a
higher volume of business is desirable, it has low visibility costs to soci-
ety to the extent that the cost of capital is thereby raised. Profession-
als win, but investors and the public may lose from such a policy.
For all these reasons, much as Clemenceau said about war and the
generals, enforcement policy is too important to be left to the discre-
tion of the enforcers.
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